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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction over this case pursuant
to Utah Code Section 59-1-602 for two reasons. First, under section 59-1602( l)(a), the Petitioners are aggrieved parties that appeared before the Utah State
Tax Commission and now appeal the Commission's decision. The Commission's
Decision is included as Exhibit 1.
And second, under section 59-l-602(l)(b), Wasatch County, CrossPetitioner, has had its tax revenues affected by the Commission's decision and is a
"party in interest in the proceeding before the court." The Utah Supreme Court
also has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code Section 63G-4-403(l)
because this is a review of the Commission's "final action resulting from [its]
formal adjudicative proceedings." The Supreme Court poured this appeal over to
this Court pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This
Court now has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Section 78A-4103(2)0).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
A.

Issues:
1.

Whether Petitioners' appeal constitutes a challenge to the

Utah State Tax Commission's findings of fact and should therefore be barred for
the failure to marshal the evidence supporting the Commission's findings?
2.

Whether the Utah State Tax Commission ("the Commission")

properly rejected Petitioners' request to allocate value to Petitioners' one-acre
1

home sites using the indiscriminate, pro rata methodology in favor of applying an
allocation methodology that recognizes the true value of the one-acre home sites?
3.

Whether the Commission's application of 65% of the value of

the Petitioners' entire 160-acre lots1 to the ten-acre building envelopes within
those lots—instead of to the one-acre home sites within those ten-acre building
envelopes as recommended by Wasatch County's expert Mr. Blaine Hales—is
supported by substantial evidence?
B.

Evidence that the Issues were Preserved in the Formal Agency
Adjudication:

In relation to the abovementioned issues of factual finding, Wasatch
County responds to the Petitioner's appeal, and presents its own cross-appeal, by
citing to the following formal adjudicative determinations:
Regardless of the fact that a one-acre home site may not legally be sold
separately from the 159 acres of the lot, the County must allocate a fair
market value to the one-acre based on the express language of the FAA. . . .
Absent evidence from Petitioner's experts that addressed the disparity in
value, the Commission accepts Mr. Hales conclusion that 65% of the value
of the total lot is attributable to the developable portion of the land
However, the Commission finds that the building site is not one-acre, it is
ten-acres.

1

Of the seven properties owned by Petitioners, six are 160-acres in size; one—that
of Michael Sulh\an—is 184 acres. Record at 55-56; Exhibit 1 pp. 2-3. For ease
of reference throughout this brief, the lots will be referred to as 160-acre lots.
2

Record at 064, Exhibit 1, p. 11.
Although the one-acre home site may not legally be sold separately, Utah
Code Sec. 59-2-507 requires that the County assess it at fair market value
and is the specific and controlling statute on the taxation of a home site
used in connection with greenbelt property.
Record at 069; Exhibit 1, p. 16
Although the Commission disagrees with the limitation of the analysis to
the one-acre [home sites], because the entire 10 acres is developable with
the possibility of a second home, garages, barns,. .. and so forth,... the
Commission finds that in the absence of testimony and evidence to the
contrary, Mr Hales' analysis adequately supports that 65% of the value is
attnbutable to the [ten-acre] buildable envelope for these properties.
Record at 070; Exhibit 1, p 17.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A Issue #1
The first issue presents an issue of law Whether an issue is one of fact or
one of law is, itself, an issue of law In Alta Pacific v Utah State Tax Comm 'n,
931 P.2d 103 (Utah 1997), the Utah Supreme Court engaged in a lengthy
discussion, among multiple opinions, regarding whether a particular aspect of a
valuation methodology constituted an issue of fact or of law The Court ended up
holding—the concurrences outnumbenng the lead opinion on this point—that the
valuation methodology presented an issue of law Id. at 120 (concurrence of
3

Mclff, District Judge); see also Id. at 117 (concurrence of C J. Zimmerman). If
this Court finds that the method of allocation involves a question of fact, the Court
may decline to reach the arguments in Petitioners' appeal for failing to marshal the
evidence. Schmidt v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n9 1999 UT 48, ^ 7, 980 P.2d 690,
692 (internal quotations omitted) ("a party challenging the Commission's factual
findings bears the burden of marshaling all evidence supporting the findings and
showing that the evidence is insufficient").
B. Issue #2
As argued in the body of this brief addressing Issue #1, the standard of
review for the second issue—the rejection of Petitioners' proposed pro rata
methodology—is an issue of fact. The choice of valuation methodology usually
presents an issue of fact. Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm 7z, 916 P.2d 344,
355 (Utah 1996) ( "the choice of valuation methodology used in fixing the value
of a property is a question of fact"). When reviewing questions of fact, this Court
"shall grant the commission deference concerning its written findings of fact,
applying a substantial evidence standard on review." § 59-l-610(l)(a); Exhibit 2,
P.

i.
Petitioners, of course, assert that the issue is solely one of law. There is

some precedent for the assertion that an appraisal methodology can sometimes
present an issue of law. In Aha Pacific Associates, a divided court held that issues
involving valuation methodologies are issues of law only when examining the
"outer limits" that circumscribe the Commission's "permissible area of judgment
4

and discretion." 931 P.2d at 120 (controlling concurrence of Mclff, District
Judge). If this Court concludes that Petitioners' appeal presents an "outer limits"
analysis—i.e., that it attempts to show that the Commission's choice of
methodology was beyond the outer limits of the Commission's discretion—then it
will accept Petitioners' characterization of their argument as an issue of law, and it
will review the issue for correctness, without granting the commission deference.
§ 59-1-610 (l)(b); Exhibit 2, p. 1.
The Commission, below, has somewhat expressed its own opinion
regarding the nature of Petitioners' arguments advanced below. It concluded that
the question of value of the one-acre home sites in this case presents "both legal
and factual issues." Record at 69; Exhibit 1, p. 16 (emphasis added). Notably,
however, the Commission did not conclude that the question of methodology was
a mixed question of fact and law. To the contrary, it found facts to exist that
render Petitioners' proposed pro rata allocation method inapposite.2 The context
of the Commission's foregoing statement indicates that the only legal issue it
found to be mixed with the factual ones was whether Utah Code Section 59-2301.2 prohibits the County from complying with Utah Code Section 59-2-507.
Record at 69; Exhibit 1, p. 16. This issue—advanced at the formal hearing by

2

These facts, as discussed in the body of the brief, include the finding that "there
is a clearly identifiable difference between" the individual acres within the 160acre lots due to non-uniform application of a conservation easement. Record at
64; Exhibit 1, p. 11. This identifiable difference in the acreage creates a "disparity
in value" among those acres which Petitioners' indiscriminate pro rata allocation
methodology failed to address. Id.
5

Petitioners' legal expert, Professor David Thomas—appears to have been
abandoned by Petitioners on appeal, so it is not addressed further in this brief.
Being thus abandoned by Petitioners, the only legal issue that the Commission
found to be mixed with the factual ones is no longer involved in this case, and this
Court can concur with the County's argument that Petitioners present an issue that
is exclusively one of fact.
Nevertheless, if this Court concludes, for other reasons, that Petitioners'
issue mixes questions of law and fact, it will apply an "intermediate level of
review, which analyzes the decision for reasonableness and rationality."
Department of Transportation v. Personnel Review Board, 798 P.2d 761, 764
(Utah App. 1990). "When agency expertise and special knowledge aid in the
application of statutory terms to factual situations, the decision is reviewed under a
reasonableness standard." Id. "Thus, agency interpretation of statutes it is
empowered to administer is often inseparable from its application of the rules of
law to basic facts." Id. at 764-65 (internal quotations omitted). However, it has
also been observed, rather unhelpfully, that "[t]he characterization of an issue as a
mixed question of law and fact sometimes begins, rather than ends, the inquiry as
to how closely the appellate court will scrutinize what the initial forum has done."
Aha Pacific, 931 P.2d at 117 (concurrence of Chief Justice Zimmerman).
C. Issue #3
The third issue is a question of fact. The standard of review for questions
of fact is set forth in Utah Code Section 59-l-610(l)(a), which provides that this
6

Court "shall grant the commission deference concerning its written findings of
fact, applying a substantial evidence standard on review." Exhibit 2, p. 1. The
Utah Supreme Court has held that the "[substantial evidence standard is that
quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable
mind to support a conclusion." Schmidt v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 1999 UT 48,1j
7, 980 P.2d 690, 692 (internal quotations omitted). "In addition, a party
challenging the Commission's factual findings bears the burden of marshaling all
evidence supporting the findings and showing that the evidence is insufficient."
Id. (citing Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1385 (Utah
1993)).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
A.

Utah Constitution, Article XIII, Section 6(4):
Notwithstanding the powers granted to the State Tax Commission in
this Constitution, the Legislature may by statute authorize any court
established under Article VIII to adjudicate, review, reconsider, or
redetermine any matter decided by the State Tax Commission
relating to revenue and taxation.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

A.

Utah Code Section 59-1-610 (Standard of review of appellate court).
Attached as Exhibit 2.

B.

Utah Code Section 59-2-102(12) (Definition of "fair market value").
Attached as Exhibit 3.

C.

Utah Code Section 59-2-507 (Land included as agricultural - Site of
farmhouse excluded - Taxation of Structures and site of farmhouse).
Attached as Exhibit 4.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case

This appeal is from the final decision of the Utah State Tax Commission,
Jane Phan, Administrative Law Judge presiding, issued April 1, 2008. Judge
Phan's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision are attached as
Exhibit 1.
B.

Course of the Proceedings

This case originated at the Utah State Tax Commission ("the
Commission"), where a formal hearing was held on December 18 and 19, 2007.
The Commission issued its written Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Final Decision on April 1, 2008. Record at 54-78; Exhibit 1. Petitioners
petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for review on April 10, 2008, pursuant to Utah
Code Sections 59-1-602 and 63G-4-403. Wasatch County filed a cross-petition in
the Utah Supreme Court on April 24, 2008. The Supreme Court exercised its
discretion, as authorized by Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
to delegate this case to the Utah Court of Appeals.
C.

Disposition at Agency

The Commission heard sharply divergent evidence regarding the
appropriate allocation of value to Petitioners' one-acre home sites at issue in this
8

case. Petitioners submitted evidence that the one-acre home sites should be valued
at l ^ O * of the value of the 160-acre lots in which these home sites are located
because the home sites, which cannot be sold separately, have no fair market
value. The County submitted evidence that the one-acre home sites should be
valued at 65% of the value of the 160-acre lots in which the home sites are located
because this percentage reflects the value of the legal right to build a home on
these lots.
The Commission observed, "[although the one-acre home site may not
legally be sold separately, Utah Code Sec. 59-2-507 requires that the County
assess it at fair market value." Record at 69; Exhibit 1, p. 16. It agreed with both
parties that the appropriate method to arrive at that fair market value was through
"allocating" a portion of the fair market value of the entire 160-acre lot to the oneacre home site. Record at 064; Exhibit, p. 11 ("the County must allocate a fair
market value to the one-acre based on the express language of the [Farmland
Assessment Act]"). However, the Commission found that the Petitioners'
proposed method of allocation—a pro rata method of applying an equal value to
any given acre within the lot—failed to address the "disparity in value" that should
be reflected by an appropriate allocation. Id. Consequently, the Commission
adopted the County's evidence and then applied its own modification to it.
The Commission concluded that the County's prdposed 65% allocation
should be attributed to "the developable portion of the land" instead of merely to
the one-acre home site. Id. Observing that the "developable portion" of each 1609

acre lot is spread over a ten-acre building envelope, within which each one-acre
home site must be located, the Commission applied the 65% allocation to this tenacre building envelope. Then, to find the value of the one-acre home site within
that envelope, the Commission divided by ten. Record at 65; Exhibit 1, p. 12.
This resulted in each home site being allocated 6.5% of the value of its 160-acre
lot—one order of magnitude greater than suggested by Petitioners and one order of
magnitude less than suggested by the County. Effectively, this reduced the
County's proposed valuation of the one-acre home sites by 90%.3
RELEVANT FACTS
Petitioners' properties at issue in this appeal are located in the prestigious
Wolf Creek Ranches subdivision in Wasatch County. This is a platted subdivision
divided into lots of 160-acres, or larger, in size. Record at 56; Exhibit 1, p. 3.
"Although each parcel is 160 acres or larger, it can be developed as only one,
single family home site." Id. Each owner may designate a ten-acre building
envelope within the lot in which a single primary residence as well as one caretaker dwelling, bams, corrals, and other agricultural improvements may be
constructed. Record at 57; Exhibit 1, p. 4. The remaining 150-acres, or more, of
each lot remains subject to a conservation easement in perpetuity, on which no
improvements may ever be installed and no mining can ever be conducted. Id.
Petitioners' property is located in Wasatch County's "Preservation-160

3

Petitioners initiated the present appeal because the Commission did not go even
further and reduce the assessed value of the one-acre home sites by 99%.
10

zone" which allows "one residence per 160 acres." Id.
Each of Petitioners' lots, prior to 2006, was assessed under the Farmland
Assessment Act ("the FAA"), found in Title 59, Chapter 2, Part 5 of the Utah
Code. Record at 58; Exhibit 1, p. 5. This act requires county assessors to ignore
fair market value and "consider only those indicia of value that the land has for
agricultural use." Utah Code Annotated § 59-2-505(1). By January 1, 2006,
however, each Petitioner had built, or begun to build, a dwelling on a one-acre
home site within their respective lots. Section 59-2-507(2) of the FAA requires
assessors to value "the land on which the farmhouse is located, and land used in
connection with the farmhouse . . . using the same standards, methods, and
procedures that apply to other taxable structures and other land in the county."
Exhibit 4, p. 1. In other words, the home site was no longer valued only for its
"agricultural use," but for its "fair market value."
Using fair market value analysis and evaluations of comparable properties,
the Wasatch County Assessor ("the Assessor") had initially determined each oneacre home site to contain 60% of the value of its respective lot. Consequently, as
each home site was taken out of the FAA, the Assessor assessed and valued the
one-acre home sites at 60% of the fair market value of the entirety of each lot.
The remaining acreage of each lot (159-acres or more) remained in the FAA and
received the nominal "greenbelt" tax assessment provided under the Act.
At the formal hearing below, the County presented evidence of its
allocation methodology and the need for the method to comply with the FAA.
11

The County's expert, Blaine Hales, testified that 65% of the value of each 160acre lot should be allocated to its one-acre home site. Record at 1432 (lines 4-16).
The Petitioners, on the other hand, presented evidence that the one-acre home sites
had no independent fair market value at all (Record at 69; Exhibit 1, p. 16) and
proposed that the Commission therefore allocate a pro rata value of 1/160 (or
about 0.6%) of the value of the 160-acre lot to the one-acre home site. Record at
60; Exhibit l,p. 7.
The Commission found, as a finding of fact, that the Petitioners' proposed
methodology was unresponsive to the mandates of the FAA and did not "reflect[]
the reality that the building site is worth more than the undevelopable property
subject to the conservation easement." Record at 064; Exhibit 1, p. 11. In
addition the Commission held, as a conclusion of law, that "in the absence of
testimony and evidence [from the Petitioners] to the contrary, [the County's] . . .
analysis adequately supports that 65% of the value is attributable to the building
envelope for these properties." Record at 070; Exhibit 1, p. 17. The Commission
declined, however, to adopt Mr. Hales' recommendation that the 65% allocation
should be limited only to the one-acre home site.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Petitioners should be barred from challenging the Commission's
findings of fact. Utah law requires any party challenging the Commission's
findings of fact to marshal all the facts supporting the finding. Petitioners, having
characterized the issue they raise as strictly one of law, have declined to marshal
12

the evidence. Therefore, this Court should accept all of the facts, which have not
been appropriately challenged, as true.
All the parties agree that "allocation of value" to the one-acre home sites is
a necessary methodology to apply in this case because the one-acre home sites
cannot be sold separately from the 160-acre lots in which they are located.
However, Petitioners suggest that an indiscriminate pro rata allocation is the only
legally permissible allocation methodology that can be used. The only legal basis
alleged to support this assertion on appeal is the statutory definition of "fair
market value." Fortunately, the definition of "fair market value" does not lead to
this conclusion. Therefore, the Tax Commission appropriately considered the
reality that each acre within the 160-acre lots is not identical. An accurate
allocation of fair market value must take into account the property rights and
potential use that inure to the acre being assessed and valued as required by the
FAA.
The Commission found that the County's expert, Blaine Hales, was the
only witness who attempted to allocate a fair market value to the one-acre home
sites in a manner that reflected reality. However, the Commission nevertheless
modified Mr. Hales' recommendations and applied the 65% allocation of value—
which he had intended only for the one-acre home sites—to the ten-acre building
envelopes in which the one-acre home sites are located. This modification has the
practical effect of diluting the value of the home sites by 90%. After marshaling
the evidence in support of the Commission's finding, the County believes that it
13

becomes apparent that the Commission misconstrued Mr. Hales1 short-handed
references to the "right to build"—inferring that by this term Mr. Hales was
referring to the right to build anything. However, taken in context, and taking the
entirety of Mr. Hales' testimony into account, it becomes clear that Mr. Hales'
analysis only addressed the one-acre home sites and the right to build a single
home thereon. He neither attempted nor intended a valuation of the rights to build
a caretaker dwelling, barns, corrals, or other outbuildings. Thus his 65%
allocation of value should have been limited to the one-acre home sites as he
intended.

14

DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
I. THE PETITIONERS ARE BARRED FROM CHALLENGING THE
COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT BECAUSE THEY DECLINED
TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE.
Utah Code Section 63G-4-403(4)(g) requires a party seeking relief from an
"agency action [that] is based upon a determination of fact... [to show that the
agency's determination] is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in
light of the whole record before the court." This Court has interpreted section
63G-4-403(4)(g) to mean that "[a] party seeking to overturn the Commission's
factual findings must 6marshal[] all of the evidence supporting the findings and
show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or
contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence.'"
Whitear v. Labor Comm fn, 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting, in part,
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm 'n, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah
App. 1989)). In addition, if a party does not marshal the evidence as explained
above, this Court "assume[s] the record supports the Commission's findings."
Whitear, 973 P.2d at 985 (citing Intermountain Health Care v. Industrial Comm >z,
839 P.2d 841, 844 (Utah App. 1992)).
In the present case, the Petitioners claim they are not challenging the factual
findings of the Commission. Brief of Petitioners at 9 ("Petitioners do not appeal
the Tax Commission's Final Decision Findings of Fact."). However, the
Petitioners do attempt to promulgate arguments that challenge the very core of the
Commission's findings of fact.
15

First, the Petitioners challenge the method of land valuation, a classic
factual determination. See Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 916 P.2d
344, 355 (Utah 1996) (holding "the choice of valuation methodology used in
fixing the value of a property [to be] a question of fact").
At the Commission's formal hearing, Wasatch County presented testimony
supporting the allocation of 65% of the value of the entire 160-acre lot to the oneacre home sites. The Petitioners argued that the value of the entire lot was spread
equally, or pro rata, among each acre of the lot. Ultimately, the Commission
agreed, generally, with the County's methodology and rejected the Petitioners'
view of the facts. In fact, the Commission found that the County's expert was the
only witness who attempted to allocate based on "the reality that the building site
is worth more than the undevelopable property subject to the conservation
easement." Record at 064; Exhibit 1, p. 11.
Now, on appeal, the Petitioners again argue that the only way to value the
property is to "establish[] the 'fair market value' of each indivisible part of the lot
at an equal value to every other indivisible part of the lot." Brief of Petitioners at
9. Although the Petitioners have not identified the name of the method and have
changed the language of their description of the method in various places, it is the
same pro rata method promoted at the formal hearing and which the Commission
rejected as part of it factual findings. The Commission specifically found that the
facts do not support a pro rata valuation; instead, it found that the "building site is

16

worth more than the undevelopable" portions of each lot. Record at 064; Exhibit
l,p. 11.
If the Petitioners intended to challenge the Commission's rejection of the
pro rata method, section 63G-4-403(4)(g) requires them to have marshaled the
evidence in support of the Commission's decision to reject it and then, only after
they have done so, state the arguments in favor of the pro rata method. Here,
however, the Petitioners have declined to marshal the evidence or to even
accurately recognize the factual nature of their argument. Having declined to
address the factual underpinnings of the Commission's rejection of their proposed
methodology, the Petitioners' cannot now attack the rejection. Instead, this Court
may accept as true the Commission's unchallenged factual finding that the pro
rata methodology ineffectively captures the value of the one-acre home sites at
issue here.
Second, the Petitioners specifically dispute the facts found by the
Commission. They assert that inappropriate "comparables" were used to establish
value and that the County's appraisal of the subject property was unsound because
it "was premised on the false assumption that land possessing building rights is
always more valuable than land which does not." Brief of Petitioners at 21-22.
They even cite the appraisal testimony of Phillip Cook, their fact expert at the
formal hearing, to again urge a pro rata methodology for allocating value to the
one-acre home sites. Id. at 16-17. However, the suitability of comparables and
the value of building rights are, of course, quintessential issues of fact. [Moreover,
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they are inherent to the question of valuation methodology—a recognized factual
issue. Beaver County, 919 P.2d at 554-55. And the Commission found that
Petitioners' evidence entirely failed to address the "allocation of] a fair market
value to the one-acre" home sites "in a manner that reflects the reality that the
building site is worth more than the undevelopable property." Record at 64;
Exhibit Up. 11.
As mentioned above, the Commission found that the Petitioners did not
present any evidence that sufficiently addressed the fact that each acre in these
160-acre lots is not equal in value to every other acre. Record at 064; Exhibit 1, p.
11. The Petitioners have not marshaled the facts that support this finding. On
appeal, however, the Petitioners argue that the allocation of value utilized by the
County, and essentially adopted by the Commission, is "entirely arbitrary . . . [and
a] violation of basic appraisal principles." Brief of Petitioners at 17 (quoting the
formal hearing testimony of fact expert, J. Phillip Cook). Although the County
somewhat responds to the substance of this argument in Section II of this brief,
this Court should not entertain the Petitioners' argument because it neither
properly identifies the argument as a factual challenge nor marshals the evidence
supporting the Commission's findings.
Moreover, because the Petitioners have not marshaled the evidence, this
Court should accept as true—at least as far as the Petitioners' arguments are
concerned—all of the facts found to be true by the Commission, including the
"disparity in value" among the acres in the 160-acre lots. Record at 64; Exhibit 1,
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p. 11. This is an appropriate result because, by not challenging any factual
findings, the Petitioners have effectively accepted and endorsed all of the
Commission's factual findings themselves, even where those findings conflict with
the arguments and conclusions advocated in their appeal.
After accepting the Commission's factual findings as true, the Petitioners'
arguments for a pro rata allocation are factually barred. For example, in
explaining the "disparity in value" among the acres in the 160-acre lots, the
Commission found that "once the 10-acre building envelope has been designated,
the value is no longer equally contributed on a per acre basis" within the 160-acre
lots. Record at 064; Exhibit 1, p. 11. And it added, "Once the building envelope
has been established there is a clearly identifiable difference between the 10-acre
building envelope and the remainder of the property, a difference that does impact
how these two portions of property contribute to the value." Id. Having not
challenged these factual findings, Petitioners' following argument urging a pro
rata allocation is eviscerated:
the 'fair market value' of any single acre of an indivisible plat of
land withdrawn from 'greenbelt' must be assessed for 'rollback' tax
purposes, at a value that is and can be no higher than the value
assessed for any other acre. Each of the 160 acres has equal value.
Brief of Petitioners at 12.
In sum, the Petitioners would have this Court accept all of the facts found
by the Commission to be true. See Brief of Petitioners at 3 (stating the petition for
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review "does not raise an issue of fact"). Nevertheless, they request this Court to
disregard some of the most important facts found to exist by the Commission by
promoting arguments inconsistent with those facts. For these reasons, the County
asks this Court to reject Petitioners' request for relief as inconsistent with the
unchallenged facts found to be true by the Commission.
II. UTAH LAW DOES NOT ESTABLISH THE PRORATA METHOD OF
ALLOCATION AS THE ONLY LAWFUL METHOD OF ALLOCATING
VALUE WITHIN A PARCEL OF PROPERTY.
While Petitioners do not cite Alta Pacific v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 931
P.2d 103, 120 (Utah 1997) (Mclff, District Judge, concurring), the County
recognizes that in rare circumstances the issue of valuation methodology can be a
question of law when it deals with the "outer limits" that "circumscribe the
permissible area of judgment and discretion" of the Commission. This precedent
does not diminish the validity of the County's arguments in section I of this brief,
however, because the factual finding of "disparity in value" among the acres
within the 160-acre lots remains an unchallenged finding of fact. This factual
finding, being unchallenged, eviscerates the applicability of the pro rata method
of allocation to this case. Nevertheless, the County will briefly show that Utah
law does not require that a pro rata allocation be the only method of allocation
used in situations like the present.
Petitioners' support their argument for a pro rata allocation with only two
bases—one a matter of fact and one a matter of law. The first basis—the one of
fact—is that the one-acre home sites cannot be sold separately. The second
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basis—the one of law—is that the foregoing fact cannot be ignored under Utah's
definition of "fair market value." The County agrees with the fact that the oneacre home sites cannot be sold separately. However, neither the definition of "fair
market value" nor any other Utah law establishes that the pro rata method of
allocation is the only method that accurately captures the value of indivisible acres
of land.
Utah Code Section 59-2-102(12) defines "fair market value" as follows:
'Fair market value' means the amount at which property would
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither
being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having
reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. For purposes of
taxation, 'fair market value' shall be determined using the current
zoning law applicable to the property in question. . ..
Exhibit 3, p. 1.
From this definition, it is clear that "fair market value" contemplates a
hypothetical transaction between a "willing buyer" and a "willing seller." It
further requires that currently applicable zoning laws be taken into account.
Before Petitioners' application of this statute to the facts of this case is addressed,
we will next address the statutes in the FAA that require these one-acre home sites
to be assessed for their fair market value in the first placQ.
Utah Code Section 59-2-507(2) explains that the land on which a
"farmhouse" is located is to be valued differently from tfye rest of the farm;
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namely, while the farm is valued only for its agricultural use, the land connected
with the farmhouse is valued for its fair market value:
All structures which are located on land in agricultural use, the
farmhouse and the land on which the farmhouse is located, and land
used in connection with the farmhouse, shall be valued, assessed,
and taxed using the same standards, methods, and procedures that
apply to other taxable structures and other land in the county."
Exhibit 4, p. 1.
And finally, Utah Code Section 59-2-510, entitled "Separation of land,"
further explains how portions of otherwise agricultural land must be valued and
assessed differently if they are not being put to agricultural use:
Separation of a part of the land which is being valued, assessed, and
taxed under this p a r t . . . for a use other than agricultural, subjects
the land which is separated to liability for the applicable rollback
tax, but does not impair the continuance of agricultural use
valuation, assessment, and taxation for the remaining land if it
continues to meet the requirements of this part.
In this case, the Petitioners begin their analysis by conceding that Utah
Code Section 59-2-510 requires any acre withdrawn from agricultural greenbelt
status to be subject to the rollback tax described in section 59-2-506. Brief of
Petitioners at 11. In addition, the Petitioners correctly state that at the time of the
hearing, "[n]one of the remaining 159 .. . acres ha[d] ceased its agricultural use,
22

and hence remain[ed] subject to agricultural assessment [meaning the greenbelt
tax break]." Id. However, the Petitioners then cite to the definition of "fair market
value" to argue that because each 160-acre lot is indivisible, any acre withdrawn
from greenbelt status must have the same value as any other acre in that lot. Brief
of Petitioners at 12. But this argument contains a non sequitur which was
acknowledged by Petitioners' expert at the formal hearing below.
Petitioners' expert, Professor David Thomas, testified that Utah's definition
of "fair market value" leads to a result very different from the one the Petitioners
now advocate. He stated that a literal application of the definition of "fair market
value" requires that "no fair market value may be assigned to any portion of the
lots, only to the entire lot" because only the entire lot can be sold. Record at 1306
(lines 18-20) (emphasis added); see also Record at 1306 (lines 10-11). In response
to a clarifying question, Professor Thomas stated as follows:
Mr. Low:

Okay. So your position is there is no fair market value for the

one acre home site upon which the—these petitioners' built their homes?
Mr. Thomas: For the land, correct.
Record at 1306 (lines 21-24) (emphasis added). Thus, far from supporting a pro
rata allocation, Petitioners' reading of the definition of "fair market value" leads
to the legal conclusion that the one-acre home sites have no fair market value at
all: they are completely valueless because they are not independently marketable.
Another absurd consequence of Petitioners' legal theory is that the
surrounding land still being put to agricultural use would actually continue to be
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taxed while the one-acre home sites would not. For example, the one-acre home
site—which must be assessed by its fair market value—would have no fair market
value, so its tax would be zero. Meanwhile, the surrounding land still being put to
agricultural use would be taxed not for its "fair market value," but for its "indicia
of value that the land has for agricultural use." U.C.A. § 59-2-505(1 )(a). Thus the
agricultural land's indivisibility and unmarketability wouldn't matter; it would still
have a value and it would still be taxed at something higher than zero dollars.
This scenario incongruously rewards landowners with a reduction in their property
taxes for removing land from greenbelt.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated,
[W]hen interpreting a statute, this court looks first to the statute's
plain language to determine the Legislature's intent and purpose. We
read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its
provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and
related chapters. We follow the 'cardinal rule that the general
purpose, intent and purport of the whole act shall control, and that
all the parts be interpreted as subsidiary and harmonious to its
manifest object.'
Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ^ 17, 66 P.3d 592 (citations omitted); see also
Zissi v. State Tax Comrn 'n of Utah, 842 P.2d 848, 854 (Utah 1992) ("A general
rule of statutory construction is that a statute should be construed as a
comprehensive whole.").
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In addition,
statutes are considered to be in pari materia and thus must be
construed together when they relate to the same person or thing, to
the same class of persons or things, or have the same purpose or
object. If it is natural or reasonable to think that the understanding
of the legislature or of persons affected by the statute would be
influenced by another statute, then those statutes should be
construed to be in pari materia, construed with reference to one
another and harmonized if possible.
Utah County v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1985) (footnotes omitted).
Here, sections 59-2-102(12) (definition of "fair market value") and 59-2507 (taxation of farmhouse site) are related and must be read together, giving each
its intended meaning. Section 59-2-507 tells the County what land to remove
from agricultural use, or colloquially, greenbelt; namely, the County must value
the land associated with the farmhouse as residential land separate from the
surrounding agricultural land. Exhibit 4, p. 1. This mandate applies whether the
land associated with the farmhouse can be sold separately or not. Section 59-2102(12), on the other hand, by defining "fair market value," tells the County how
to value the land not eligible for agricultural use. Exhibit 3, p. 1. Namely, instead
of valuing it only for its agricultural value under section 59-2-505, the County
must recognize the fair market value of the land connected with the farmhouse.
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The conflict between these two statutes, exploited by Petitioners, arises in
the not uncommon situation wrhere the agricultural land is located in a zone in
which it cannot be subdivided. Here, for example, none of the 160-acre lots can
be subdivided any further because they are located in the P-160 zone;
nevertheless, the County is required to deduce the fair market value of only one of
the acres within each lot. Where the acre to be valued cannot be sold separately,
the question then arises as to how to value that indivisible, unmarketable acre.
The County is the first to admit that no easy answers exist for resolving the
difficulties of assessing and valuing an acre which cannot be sold separately. The
County Assessor testified at the formal hearing how he sought and obtained
guidance from the state and others regarding how to properly value the one-acre
home sites at issue here. Record at 1369-71. The County's assessor thoughtfully
employed a method of allocating fair market value that is logical, responsive to all
governing law, and fair. The Commission accepted, in large part, this method of
allocation and observed that it was the only method that "reflected] the reality" of
the facts on the ground, including the fact that "the building site is worth more
than the undevelopable property." Record at 064.
Allocation is, obviously, the only valuation methodology that can be used
to value an indivisible, unmarketable acre. Even Petitioners' concede this point:
their proposed pro rata valuation is itself, an allocation; it is merely an
indiscriminate allocation. Where the acre to be valued cannot be sold separately,
its value must be deduced by allocating to it a share of the overall fair market
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value of the entire lot. In the present case, the fair market values of the lots are not
in dispute—only of the one-acre home sites within those ld>ts. However, while all
parties agree that allocation is a necessary methodology, differences arise among
the allocation methods used. Each party's method of allocation is different, and
each method results in wildly different values—varying by orders of magnitude.
The County's expert, Blaine Hales, testified that 65% of the value of the
entire lot should be allocated to the home site. The basis for this testimony is
articulated in the next section of this brief. The Petitioners, on the other hand,
proposed and continue to propose, allocation on a pro rata method. Simply put,
pro rata is a method of allocation which takes the total value of the entire 160-acre
lot and indiscriminately divides—or allocates—that value equally among all acres
in the lot, regardless of the features of the land or the limitations imposed on it.
Under the pro rata method, an acre containing a rocky cliff or a sinkhole is
as valuable as a wooded acre with a spectacular view, and an acre burdened with
perpetual restrictions against development is as valuable as an acre suitable for a
primary residence. Recognizing the obtuseness of the pro rata method of
allocation, the Commission found that it did not "address[] the disparity in value"
between the developable and undevelopable portions of the individual lots. Id.
Neither at the formal hearing nor now, on appeal, do the Petitioners explain
the significance of treating every acre equally. Certainly, the definition of "fair
market value" does not lead to Petitioners' proposed method of allocation.
Instead, as already shown, if anything, Petitioners' view of this definition sets fair
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market value at zero because the one-acre home sites—alone—can never "change
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller." § 59-2-102(12); see also
Brief of Petitioners at 18 (emphasizing that the definition of "fair market value"
requires the property to be able to change hands). Apparently uncomfortable with
the extreme result of their legal theory, the Petitioners back off of it a half-step and
argue that the one-acre home sites are only almost worthless. But Petitioners'
proposed pro rata value is itself not a fair market value but an allocation of fair
market value. It is merely an allocation that ignores the true value of the one-acre
home site.
Factually, the pro rata method also ignores the reality on the ground, which
the Commission attempted to address. In rejecting the pro rata method of
allocation, for example, the Commission reasoned that "once the 10-acre building
envelope has been designated, the value is no longer equally contributed on a per
acre basis." Record at 064. Moreover, the Commission observed that under the
mandates of the Farmland Assessment Act, "[rjegardless of the fact that a one-acre
home site may not legally be sold separately from the 159 acres of the lot, the
County must allocate a fair market value to the one-acre based on the express
language of the FAA." Record at 064 (emphasis added).
In sum, the definition of "fair market value" must be read in light of the
FAA because sections 59-2-507(2) ("Taxation of structures and site of
farmhouse") and 59-2-510 ("Separation of land") of the FAA require the County
to assess and tax, separately from the agricultural acreage, those acres no longer
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being put to agricultural use. The method of allocation used to accomplish this
requirement must reflect the value of the home site as a hdme site, and not as an
indiscriminate acre within the whole. The Commission acted within its expertise
in concluding that the pro rata method neither reflected reality nor the
requirements of the FAA. The County asks that this Court likewise recognize the
shortcomings of the pro rata approach and affirm the Commission's rejection of
it.
III.

THE COMMISSION SHOULD HAVE APPLIED THE ONLY
RELIABLE EVIDENCE IT WAS GIVEN AND ALLOCATED 65% OF
THE LOT VALUES TO THE ONE-ACRE HOME SITES.
Utah Code Section 59-l-610(l)(a) states:
When reviewing formal adjudicative proceedings commenced before
the commission, the Court of Appeals . . . shall[] grant the
commission deference concerning its written findings of fact,
applying a substantial evidence standard on review. . ..

Exhibit 2, p. 1.
In referencing section 59-l-610(l)(a), the Supreme Court of Utah
concluded:
Under such a standard, we must uphold the Commission's findings
of fact if the findings 'are supported by substantial evidence based
upon the record as a whole.'
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Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm 7z, 916 P.2d 344, 354 (Utah 1996)
(quoting, in part, Zissi v. State Tax Comm 'n of Utah, 842 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah
1992)).
According to Utah Code Section 63G-4-403(4)(g), this Court will grant a
party's requested relief if that party has been "substantially prejudiced" by an
agency action that is "based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the
agency . . . when viewed in light of the whole record before the court." To the
Court this to means that "[a] party seeking to overturn the Commission's factual
findings must 'marshalf] all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that
despite the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory
evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence.'" Whitear v.
Labor Comm % 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting, in part, Grace
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm 'n, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App.
1989)).
In this case, the Respondent's expert, Blaine Hales, testified that an
allocation of 65% of the fair market value of the entire 160-acre lot to the one-acre
home site was consistent with the commonly accepted standards of appraisal
practice. Record at 1431-33. The Commission found, as a finding of fact, that the
Petitioners did not present any evidence "reflecting] the reality that the building
site is worth more than the undevelopable property subject to the conservation
easement." Id. at 064; Exhibit 1, p. 11. This left Mr. Hales' testimony as the only
reliable testimony on the appropriate allocation to be made to the one-acre home
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sites. Nevertheless, the Commission made the factual finding that, "[fjrom a
review of Mr. Hales' appraisal, his testimony at the hearing regarding the 10-acre
building site and that of the other witnesses describing the potential for the 10-acre
envelope, the Commission concludes that the 65% for the buildable portion
applies to the 10 buildable acres and is not appropriately limited to a one-acre
home site." Record at 64; Exhibit I, p. 11.
The County's contention on appeal is that in the absence of reliable
evidence to the contrary, the Commission had no basis on which to modify the
conclusions asserted in Mr. Hales' testimony. While Mr. Hales' testimony
supported an allocation of 65% of the lot's value to the one-acre home site, the
Commission modified Mr. Hales' conclusions and allocated 65% of each lot's
value to the ten-acre building envelopes within which each one-acre home site is
located. The County asserts that the Commission erred in modifying Mr. Hales'
uncontested testimony. The evidence supporting the Commission's finding, as
well as that which supports the County's position on this issue are marshaled
below.
A. Evidence that Supports the Allocation of 65% of the Value of the Lot to
the Ten-Acre Building Envelope.
According to the Commission, the evidence that supports the allocation of
65% of the value of the lot to the ten-acre building envelope, and not the one-acre
home site, comes from Mr. Hales' appraisal and formal hearing testimony, as well
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as other undisputed testimony describing the building potential of the ten-acre
envelope. Record at 064; Exhibit 1, p. 11.
1. Mr. Hales' Appraisal and Testimony
The Commission's finding most likely stems from Mr. Hales' explanation
of the building rights associated with each lot in Wolf Creek Ranches. In referring
to his land valuation methodology, Mr. Hales wrote "we must provide an
allocation of value between the one-acre building site (with all rights to build)
versus 159-acres of land with rights to graze, hunt, and recreate." Record at 51314 (emphasis added); Exhibit 5, p. 1-2. In addition, at the formal hearing, Mr.
Hales testified that he arrived at the value of the one-acre home sites in two
different ways. He valued "one acre of land," and he also valued uthe right to
build." Record at 1420 (line 5). At times such as this during his testimony, Mr.
Hales did not clearly specify that he was valuing only the right to build a primary
residence. Therefore, the Commission may have concluded that his 65%
allocation included the value of the right to build anything, which right,
concededly, applies to the entire ten-acre building envelope and not just the oneacre home site.
Another example of the blurring that the Commission may have perceived
to occur between the right to build anything and the right to build a primary
residence occurred in Mr. Hales' testimony in which he addressed the value of the
right to build a home:
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Mr. Low:

Urn—and one more point on that. As you are valuing

that home site and you're attributing to it the right to build and you['re]
valuing the right to build, there's already a home on that site. True?
Mr. Hales:

Yes.

Mr. Low:

And so to ignore that fact and to value it as if there

were 1' 160 of a home on that site wouldn't make a whole lot of sense,
would it?
Mr. Hales:

Well—you have to have the whole building right to

build a house. There is—in my mind—it's attached to the home site and
that's how they've been doing it in the past. And if I went out and did the
direct comparable sales analysis, I would be using the full right to build as
my—as part of my comparisons.
Mr. Low:

Is—is the building or residence under your

understanding of the Farmland Assessment Act, an agricultural use?
Mr. Hales:

No.

Mr. Low:

And so to say that that 159/160ths of that right to build

is being used in the agricultural land around it, does that somehow measure
to your understanding of the Farmland Assessment Act?
Mr. Hales:

Well, and again, I don't like to divide it into

percentages, but I just think that that's where the right goes - with the
house.
Record at 1423 (starting line 10) to 1424 (ending line 9) (emphases added).
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Mr. Hales also determined the value of the remaining 159-acres by finding
sales of comparable properties on which the "right to build" was restricted. Again,
he referred to this right in general terms that were apparently construed by the
Commission as the right to build anything. He testified as follows:
Mr. Low:

And then the remainder of the 159 acres, what you

were valuing there is the area, 159 acres Mr. Hales:

Yes.

Mr. Low:

And the right to graze and hunting[,] recreation.

Mr. Hales:

And—and I write that down just as a clarification

point, but it's actually all—all the rights that exist in the property less the
right to build.
Record at 1421 (lines 7-14) (emphasis added).
He further testified that his goal was to find comparables of "land without
the right to build" to "try to come up with the value for that—that 159 acres."
Record at 1425 (lines 8 and 16-17). From this and the previous testimony, the
Commission concluded that Mr. Hales erroneously lumped the nine other acres
within the ten-acre building envelope—which enjoyed some measure of building
rights—together with the 150-acres for which all building rights are prohibited by
the conservation easement. If Mr. Hales was allocating all the rights to build
anything to the one-acre home sites, then the Commission's expansion of his

34

allocation to the entire ten-acre building envelope in which improvements can
lawfully occur would have been appropriate.4
After appraising the value of unbuildable land, the second appraisal
methodology employed by Mr. Hales was "to look at what people were paying for
the right to build." Record at 1426 (lines 1-2). He found this value by looking at
the purchase price of conservation easements that had the effect of "purchasing]
the rights to build or to strip the land of any right to continue to develop—or build
cabins or home sites." Record at 1426 (lines 5-7). In discussing this second
methodology, even counsel for the County, in the questioning, at one point
inadvertently lumped the nine other developable acres in the ten-acre building
envelope together with the 150-acres that are restricted by a conservation
easement. Record at 1429 (lines 14-18).
Mr. Hales found that the purchase price of a conservation easement that
restricted all development rights on the burdened land cost between 60% and 70%
of the total value of the land. Record at 1431 (lines 8-9). Mr. Hales averaged
these to arrive at a cost of 65% of the total value of the land. Id. He observed that
some comparable conservation easements allowed some limited building rights,

4

However, one of the errors of the Commission's ruling is that it only valued what
it perceived to be "the right to build." It neglected to value the land itself. Mr.
Hales1 65% figure, however, valued both "one acre of land" and the "right to
build" on it. Record at 1420 (line 5). By expanding the right to build to all ten
acres in the building envelope, but without including a value of the other nine
acres of land, the Commission only took into account one part of Mr. Hales' twopart calculus.
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such as the right to build a future cabin, and so he placed less reliance on these
comparables. Id. (lines 1-6).
In combining these two approaches—the value of "unbuildable" land and
the value of "the right to build"—Mr. Hales testified that, for example, of
Petitioner Osborn's 160-acre lot worth $1.8 million, $1.2 million was attnbutable
to "that legal right [to build] plus an acre of land." Record at 1433 (lines 1-5).
The foregoing testimony can be construed to support the inference that Mr.
Hales' appraisal models depended on the assumption that all rights to build
anything were restricted to the one-acre building site of each lot, and that that
single acre, therefore, should be allocated all of the value to build anything. It
could also support the conclusion that he inadequately accounted for the remaining
nine "buildable" acres within the ten-acre building envelope. If the Commission
was correct that Mr. Hales' allocation rested on this assumption, then it properly
expanded Mr. Hales' 65% allocation to include all ten acres within the approved
building envelopes, in which Petitioners do in fact enjoy some rights to build
improvements.
2. Testimony Describing the Building Potential of the Ten-acre
Envelope
As part of its factual findings, the Commission stated that part of the reason
for allocating 65% of the value of each lot to the ten-acre building envelope was
because of the "potential" of the envelope, as described by some of the witnesses
at the hearing. Record at 064; Exhibit 1, p. 11. The formal hearing testimony was
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unanimous in acknowledging that the ten-acre building envelope, of which the
one-acre home site is part, is the only portion of the 160-acre lots that can be
developed and improved. The Commission correctly observed that the right to
build and improve, which is restricted entirely to the ten-acre building envelope,
makes that acreage the most valuable part of the lot. Moreover, once the ten-acre
building envelope is designated, there is no restriction as to which acre may
contain the primary residence; it can be built anywhere within the envelope.
Record at 1462 (lines 3-5) (testimony of Douglas Anderson).
Robert Crawford, Ph.D, testified that the highest and best use of each lot
was as a 160-acre residential lot. Id. at 1337. Mr. Douglas Anderson, the
developer of Wolf Creek Ranches, added that the purpose of the Ranch was to
preserve as much land as possible while limiting development to a primary
residence and a few other improvements within a ten-acre building envelope. Id.
at 1461-62. Furthermore, Mr. Glen Burgener, Wasatch County Assessor, testified
that extensive consultation with the State Tax Commission's Property Tax
Division resulted in several conclusions, including that the "bulk of the value
should be in that area that can be disturbed," meaning the "10 acre area of
disturbance." Id. at 1371 (lines 13-15).
Reading the testimony of Dr. Crawford, Mr. Anderson, and Mr. Burgener
together most likely led the Commission to reason that since development and
improvement may take place on ten acres, and not just one, the ten-acre building
envelope is what Mr. Hales was referring to when he discussed the value of the
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"right to build." Therefore, under this view of Mr. Hales' testimony, his 65%
allocation should have been spread over the ten-acre building envelope and not the
one-acre home site.
B. Evidence that Supports the Allocation of 65% of the Value of the Lot to
the One-Acre Home Site.
The Commission was correct in finding the ten-acre building envelope to
be the most valuable land within the 160-acre lots, because the only improvements
permitted on the lot must exist within the confines of these building envelopes.
However, the Commission erred in finding the ten-acre building envelope to be
65% of the fair market value of the entire lot because there was no substantial
evidence to support such a finding. Instead, the only appraisal testimony found to
be reliable by the Commission—that of Blaine Hales—was directed at the right to
build a primary residence on one-acre of land, and not the right to build a
caretaker's dwelling, barn, corral or other structure within the other nine acres of
the ten-acre building envelope. While this distinction could have been made more
clearly, the evidence taken as a whole indicates that this is what was meant.
First, at the formal hearing, Mr. Hales plainly testified that his appraisal
was directed at arriving at the value of the one-acre home sites, and not the value
of the as yet undeveloped nine acres within the ten-acre building envelope:
Mr. Low:

What was the purpose of the preparation of your

report?
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Mr. Hales:

Um—when I was—when I was contacted, I was asked

to help estimate the value—or allocate the value of the—the home site of a
property for greenbelt purposes.
Record at 1413 (lines 16-21) (emphasis added).
This understanding was repeated later:
Mr. Low:

Okay. As you followed through with your assignment,

I guess, which was to appraise the one acre home site—the home sites
here—
Mr. Hales:

Mm-hmm.

Record at 1415 (starting line 24) to 1416 (ending line 2).
In light of this understanding, Mr. Hales testified that the one-acre home
site, and not the ten-acre building envelope, should be allocated 65% of the fair
market value of the entire lot. He stated:
Mr. Hales:

Right. And I used . . . data that was measured in

percentages and that it would be reasonable for the county assessor because
each lot up there—you know—has a different value. And the value of
the—what they 're buying is a home site—and so that percentage would
cross over well as we appraise other properties or as the assessor appraises
other properties. If he has a percentage, he can be more consistent in his
evaluation.
Mr. Low:

Okay. And what is that percentage?

Mr. Hales:

That percentage is 65% [of the value of the lot].
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Record at 1432 (lines 6-16) (emphasis added).
The home site, and not the building envelope, was the focus of Mr. Hales'
testimony because Utah Code Section 59-2-507(2) only requires the "site of the
farmhouse," or "the land on which the farmhouse is located" to be valued for its
residential use. Neither the County, nor the Commission for that matter, was ever
required to value the other nine acres in the ten-acre building envelope in this case
because none of those other nine acres had been removed from agricultural use.
It is evident from the language used throughout the CC&Rs of Wolf Creek
Ranches, and especially in Section 7.3 of that document, that the home site is that
parcel of land on which the primary single family dwelling is constructed. Record
at 125; Exhibit 6, p. 1. Section 7.3 also makes a plain distinction between the site
on which the primary dwelling is located and the rest of the developable area,
including the site of the caretaker dwelling and the sites of the allowable
nonresidential improvements. Record at 125; Exhibit 6, p. 1.
Mr. Hales and other witnesses distinguished between the one-acre on which
the home is located and the larger ten-acre building envelope, of which the home
site is a part.
i Mr. Low:

. . . And you indicate that the building site which you

are allocating to that, and which you are valuing, was one-acre of land in
terms of space and area, is that right?
Mr. Hales:

Yes.
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Mr. Low:

And that's consistent with the area that Mr. Burgener

[Wasatch County Assessor] said that he applies countywide—the
home site in agricultural land is one-acre.
Mr. Hales:

Right.

Record at 1420 (lines 14-22).
Given that Mr. Hales' testimony plainly articulated the value of the oneacre home site to be 65% of the value of the lot, and given that the meaning of the
term "home site" was understood by the parties and the Commission, the
Commission can only have inferred that Mr. Hales' short-hand references during a
part of his testimony to the "right to build" included the right to build anything,
and not just the right to build a primary residence on the one-acre home site. This
inference would have led the Commission to allocate Mr. Hales' 65% value of the
"right to build" to the ten-acre building envelope instead of to the one-acre home
site as he had recommended.
That the Commission's application of Mr. Hales' testimony to the ten-acre
building envelope is mistaken should be clear from the context of his testimony.
For example, at one point Mr. Hales stated that what he was "valuing here is one
acre of land and the right to build." Record at 1420 (lines 4-5). Taken in
isolation, this shorthand reference to "the right to build" could be inferred to mean
the right to build anything in the ten-acre building envelope. However, just a few
lines later the meaning was clarified as the "right to build a residence." Record at

41

1420 (lines 23-25) through 1421 (lines 1-6); see also Record at 1420 (lines 19-22)
(narrowing the right to build to the "home site").
Mr. Hales' testimony only supports the conclusion that 65% of the value of
the lot should be allocated to the one-acre home site.
Mr. Low:

. . . [W]hy did you feel that that was the way to go

about this [meaning, to value the home site via allocation]? You valued the
one-acre home sites, you value the land at one-acre, plus that one stick of
the right to build. Could you explain that to me?
Mr. Hales:

. . . . The point is there is one building right and the

question is should that value be included with the home site or should it be
included with the agricultural land and kept from being taxed as most
homeowners are taxed. And the way that they've been doing [assessments]
in the past is the right to build . . . is valued in that one-acre home site
because they used comparable sales of one-acre lots that are improved with
homes.

Mr. Hales:

. . . . [I]f you go and look at the property [in Wolf

Creek Ranches] and look at all of the amenities that a property owner
would enjoy for having a one-acre home site in that subdivision, that would
be a very valuable site. And no, a one-acre lot is not w[or]th as much as a
160 acre lot, but it is still very, very valuable.
Record at 1421 (starting line 21) through 1423 (ending line 9).
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Thus Mr. Hales' 65% allocation represents two figures: "one acre of land"
plus "that one stick" of legal rights; namely, the right to build a home on that acre.
At no point in Mr. Hales' testimony did he ever discuss or attempt to value the
right to build a caretaker's dwelling, a barn, a corral, or any other such
outbuilding. Neither did he attempt to value the nine acres of land remaining in
the ten-acre building envelopes. The complete lack of any evidence regarding
these values should have given the Commission pause before expanding Mr.
Hales' 65% figure to the ten-acre building envelope.
One reason why the value of the right to build a barn, corral, or other
outbuilding was not attempted is that it might not be possible to do so. In
discussing the value of land that lacks the "right to build," Mr. Hales addressed
one of his comparables that also lacked the "right to build." It was an 80-acre
parcel adjacent to Wolf Creek Ranches. Record at 1427 (lines 18-24). An issue
had previously developed in the testimony of Petitioners' appraisal expert, Philip
Cook, as to whether this particular comparable was an appropriate one because it
was purchased by the owner of adjacent land and, when combined with the
adjacent land, gave that purchaser at least 160-total acres—the minimum size to
qualify for a building permit. This purchaser, prior to purchasing the 80-acre
parcel, apparently lacked sufficient acreage to obtain a building permit. In
discussing the "right to build" that sprang into existence as a result of this
purchase, the right was repeatedly referred to as the ability to acquire a "building
permit." Record at 1428 (lines 1-2, lines 6-7, line 14); Record at 1429 (line 2).
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The equating of the "right to build" with a "building permit" is instructive
regarding the intent of Mr. Hales' testimony. Utah law does not require a building
permit for "a stmcture used solely in conjunction with agriculture use, and not for
human occupancy." Utah Code Section 58-56-4(5)(a). Thus, even though the
Petitioners' lots are located in the P-160 zone, this zone only limits the ability to
obtain permits to build a home, and not the ability to build a bam, a corral, or other
outbuildings. Valuing the right to build a bam, therefore, is impractical. In fact,
even when Mr. Hales valued the conservation easement itself, he only used
comparables that stripped the right to build homes and cabins, not bams and
corrals. Record at 1426 (lines 5-7). Therefore, where Mr. Hales never intended to
value the right to build bams, corrals, and outbuildings, the repeated short-hand
references in his testimony to the "right to build" clearly referred to the right to
build a home. And each 160-acre lot authorized the construction of only a single
primary residence. When valuing this right—the right to build a home—Mr.
Hales attributed that entire right only to the one-acre home site where that right
was exercised, and not to the other nine acres in the ten-acre building envelope
where it was not.
The reason for allocating that entire right only to the one-acre home site is
succinctly put by Mr. Hales when he said,
"Well—you have to have the whole building right to build a house. There
is—in my mind—it's attached to the home site and that's how they've been
doing it in the past. And if I went out and did the direct comparable sales
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analysis, I would be using the full right to build as my—as part of my
comparisons."
Record at 1423 (lines 18-23). Thus, in Mr. Hales' methodology, the 65%
allocation attributable to the right to build a home should be allocated to that acre
where this right was exercised, and not spread among an additional nine acres
where it was not exercised.
The evidence at the formal hearing was that the P-160 zone in which
Petitioners' properties are located permitted them to build one single family
residence. Record at 56; Exhibit 1, p. 3.5 The conservation easement which
burdened these lots mirrored the requirements of the zone: one home site is
allowed, as well as one caretaker's dwelling and as many agricultural buildings or
improvements as desired. Record at 57; Exhibit 1, p. 4.
It is noteworthy that the Commission observed that the County did not
provide evidence showing "which portion of the [65%] is attributable to each acre
[in the ten-acre building envelope]." Record at 065; Exhibit 1, p. 12. The
Commission is absolutely correct in this observation. The County did not present
evidence of value of the other nine acres within the ten-acre building envelope
because those acres were not at issue: they had not been removed from
agricultural use. Consequently, these other nine acres were not the focus of the
case, and the County had no reason to obtain or present evidence establishing their
5

What is less clear in the record is that the zone, at the time this development
vested in its property rights, also allowed the construction of a single caretaker's
dwelling. This right is also guaranteed by the conservation easement.
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value. Therefore, it is somewhat inconsistent for the Commission to apply Mr.
Hales' 65% allocation figure to the entire ten-acre building envelope—when he
intended it to only apply to the one-acre home site—and then fault Mr. Hales for
not telling them how to do it.
Nevertheless, when examining Mr. Hales' figures, it is seen that there is
room for inference on the approximate value of the remaining nine acres within
the ten-acre building envelopes. He testified that 65% of the value of the 160-acre
lot should be allocated to the one-acre home site. He also testified that the
conservation-easement burdened land should be valued at about $3,000 per acre.
Record at 1432 (lines 2-3). Applying these figures to the facts at hand, of a typical
160-acre lot worth $1.8 million, the one-acre home site, at 65%, should be valued
at $1.2 million. Record at 1432 (starting line 17) through 1433 (ending line 5).
The 150 undevelopable acres, at $3,000 per acre, should be valued at about
$450,000. Adding the value of the one-acre homesite ($1.2 million) to the value
of the 150 undevelopable acres ($450,000) equals $1.65 million. Under Mr.
Hales' analysis, therefore, approximately $150,000 of the $1.8 million lot value
remains available for allocation to the remaining nine acres within the ten-acre
building envelopes.
If asked, Mr. Hales could have investigated and testified as to how to
allocate this $150,000 to the other nine acres in the ten-acre building envelope.
However, as those nine acres were not at issue, any differences in allocation
among them were never discussed. Therefore, while we know that about
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SI50,000 should be allocated to those nine acres, we don't know whether any
particular acre within those nine should be valued differently from another.
Nevertheless, the Commission's decision entirely ignores, certainly inadvertently,
this 5150,000 of unallocated value. When the Commission expanded Mr. Hales'
65% value—which he had intended to apply only to the one-acre homesite—to
apply to the entire ten-acre building envelope, this unallocated $150,000—
intended to apply to the remaining nine acres in the envelope—escaped the
Commission's attention. Under the Commission's decision as it now stands, this
$150,000 apparently must remain forever unallocated.
Not only does the Commission's decision erroneously fail to account for, or
allocate, $150,000 of the fair market value, but it also unreasonably dilutes the
value of the one-acre home sites as testified to by Mr. Hales. Mr. Hales was the
only witness who allocated a fair market value to the one-acre home sites "in a
manner that reflects the reality that the building site is worth more than the
undevelopable property." Record at 64; Exhibit 1, p. 11. Nevertheless, after
finding his testimony to be the only helpful testimony on the issue, the
Commission diluted the value he established by 90%, or by one entire order of
magnitude. Thus the Commission not only arbitrarily expanded Mr. Hales'
testimony (by applying the 65% figure to the entire ten-acre parcel), but it then
also arbitrarily contracted it (by dividing by 10 to find the value of the one-acre
home site).
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In light of these facts, it is no wonder that the Commission felt itself to be
"unable to further determine which portion of the [65%] value is attributable to
each acre [within the ten-acre building envelope], other than using 1/10 of the 65%
of the total market value.'' Record at 065; Exhibit 1, p. 12. The Commission had
not been given any guidance in carrying out this unwarranted exercise. Moreover,
the Commission had overlooked that Mr. Hales' testimony intended for the
remaining, unallocated 5150,000 to be allocated to the nine remaining acres within
the ten-acre building envelope. As the Commission, by its own admission, lacked
substantial evidence on how to expand, and then contract, Mr. Hales' testimony,
this Court should reverse its factual findings on this point and, based on the record,
recognize the value of the one-acre home sites as 65% of the value of the entire
lot.
As a final matter, the County is required to establish substantial prejudice
before this Court will reverse the Commission's findings of fact. § 63G-4403(4)(g). The Commission's decision to allocate the one-acre home sites a value
of 6.5% of the entire lot value prejudices the County and its citizens. It artificially
reduces the value of the home sites by an entire order of magnitude (from an
average of SI.2 million down to an average of 5120,000), and it thereby
improperly shifts the property tax burden among the population.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Wasatch County asks this Court to uphold the
Utah State Tax Commission's rejection of Petitioners' proposed pro rata
allocation methodology. Further, Wasatch County asks this Court to reverse the
Commission's factual finding that 65% of the value of each lot is attributable to
the ten-acre building envelope. In place of the latter factual finding, the County
asks this Court to allocate 65% of the value of each lot to the one-acre home sites
that have been established in each lot.
DATED this

^2— day of December, 2008.

'-&*&&0^T/)
THOMAS L. LOW, Attorney for Wasatch County
Appellee and Cross-appellant
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EXHIBIT 1

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

WARREN AND TRICIA OSBORN, MICHAEL F.
SULLIVAN. DAVID AND CYNTHIA MIRSKY,
NORMAN PROVAN, JEFFREY AND NANCY
TRUMPER, GARY AND CATHERINE
CRITTENDEN, DAVID CHECKETTS AND
MOUNT CLYDE ENTERPRISES L.C ,

FINDINGS OF FACT. CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, AND FINAL DECISION
Appeal Nos. 06-1504, 06-1505. 06-1506, 061507,06-1508.06-1509,06-1510
Tax Type. Property Tax, Locally Assessed
Tax Year: 2006 & Roll Back Period 2001-05

Petitioner,
vs.

Judge:

Phan

BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF WASATCH
COUNTY, UTAH,
Respondent.

This Order may contain confidential ''commercial information" within the meaning of Utah Code Sec. 59-1-404,
and is subject to disclosure restrictions as set out in that section and Utah Admin. Rule R861-1A-37. The rule
prohibits the parties from disclosing commercial information obtained from the opposing party to nonparties,
outside of the hearing process. However, pursuant to Utah Admin. Rule R861-1A-37 the Tax Commission may
publish this decision, in its entirety, unless the property taxpayer responds in writing to the Commission, within
30 days of this order, specifying the commercial information that the taxpayer wants protected.
Presiding:
# Pam Hendrickson, Commission Chair
Marc Johnson, Commissioner
Jane Phan, Administrative Law Judge
Appearances:
For Petitioner:

Max Miller. Attorney at Law
Randy Grimshaw, Attorney at Law
Norman Provan. Owner
Douglas Anderson. Developer
For Respondent: Thomas Low, Wasatch County Attorney
Glen Bursener, Wasatch Countv Assessor
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for a Formal Hearing: on December

18-19, 2007

Based upon the ev idence and testimony presented at the hearing, the Tax Commission hereby

makes its"
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Appeal Nos. 06-1504. 06-1505. 06-1506, 06-1507, 06-1508, 06-1509 & 06-1510

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioners are appealing the assessed values as set by the Wasatch County Board of

Equalization for the land on the subject lots, for the 2006 tax year. In addition to the 2006 assessed value,
Petitioners Sullivan, Mirsky, Crittenden, Provan and Trumper are appealing the rollback tax assessment against
each of their properties subject to this appeal.
2.

As of the lien date at issue the properties had residences or buildings either constructed or in

partial states of construction. The value of the buildings was not at issue in this appeal.
3.

The subject properties are all located in the Wolf Creek Subdivision in Wasatch County. The

owner, parcel number, size and valuations as assessed by Respondent, which are the subject of this appeal, are
as follows:
Petitioners

Lot/Parcel No.

Acres

County's Rollback County Board's 2006
Values Appealed
Values Appealed

Warren & Tricia Osborn

61/OWR-4B61

160

No Rollback
Appeal

Land-GreenBelt $ 201,800
Land-Homesite $ 550,000

Michael Sullivan

46/OWR-3A46

184

2001-2005
$360,000 per year

Land-Greenbelt $1,040,288
Land-Homesite $ 360,000

David & Cynthia Mirsky

53>OWR-4A53

160

2002-2006
$698,200 per year

Land-Greenbelt $1,150,000

Gary & Catherine

75/OWR-5B75

160

2001-2005
$360,000 per year

Land-Greenbelt $ 562.100
Land-Homesite $1,080,000

Norman Provan

25/OWR-2A25

160

2001-2005
$773,200 per year

Land-Greenbelt $ 476,800
Land-Homesite $ 773,200

Jeffrev & Nancy Trumper

50<OWR-3A50

160

2001-2005
$360,000 per year

Land-Greenbelt $1,040,000
Land-Homesite $ 360,000

Crittenden

-2-

0000

Appeal Nos. 06-1504, 06-1505. 06-1506, 06-1507, 06-1508. 06-1509 & 06-1510

David Checketts& Mount
Clyde Enterprises LC

4.

12OWR-2012

160

No Rollback
Appeal

Land-Greenbelt S 201.800
Land-Homesite $ 845.000

The Wolf Creek Ranch subdivision ("Ranch") is an exclusive, approved and platted

subdivision. It covers approximate!) 14,000 acres and has 84 single-family home site parcels. With the
exception of a few parcels, all home site parcels in the subdivision are at least 160 acres. All parcels subject to
this appeal are 160 acres or larger. Access to the subdivision is from a main gate at 3480 Bench Creek Road in
WToodland and a secondary gate located off of Lake Creek Road in Heber City. Access to the subject lots is
provided year round by paved interior roadways, which are maintained by the subdivision.
5.

The land uses surrounding the Ranch are primarily recreational and agricultural in nature. The

Ranch shares approximately seven miles of common boarder with the Uinta National Forest on the east, which
is accessible from the Ranch. Jordanelle Reservoir is ten miles west and Rockport State Park and Reservoir 20
miles north. Park City with its ski and summer resorts is located approximately 22 miles northwest.
6.

The subdivision amenities at the Ranch include a 26-acre common area with an equestrian

center and stables, a 2,800 square foot guesthouse and two large trout stocked ponds. There is another 23-acre
common area with tepees, fire pits, campground areas, corrals and approximately one-mile of frontage along
the Upper Provo River. There are several >urts at the property that can be accessed by the residents. There is
approximately fifty miles of equestrian trails through the ranch and the entire property is protected by private
security.
7.

Although each subject parcel is 160 acres or larger, it can be developed as only one, single-

family home site.
8

The limitations on development are both from zoning and a conservation easement. The

property is zoned P-160 under the jurisdiction of Wasatch County

P-160 is a preservation zoning where
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development may be limited do to remoteness of services, topograph) and other sensitive environmental issues.
Residential development is allowed in the zoning with basically one residence per 160 acres. Conditional uses
include groupings of residential lots provided that density is not increased, water storage, fishing activities and
sand and gravel quarrying.
9.

The principal developer of the Ranch, Douglas Anderson, testified that the area had been

ranched for over one hundred years and it wras the intent in developing the Ranch to preserve large amounts of
open space and continue the ranching tradition. As there was the possibly that zoning could be changed and
higher density allowed at some point in the future by the County or other governmental jurisdiction, to insure
the restrictions remained permanently, they placed conservation easements on the property as it was
subdivided. The conservation easements were granted to the Utah Open Lands Conservation Association, Inc.
As such the subject lots are permanently encumbered by the conservation easements. The conservation
easements allow for one-home site with the improvements specifically limited to the 10-acre building envelope.
Within the 10-acre building envelope the property owner may construct both a primary single-family residence
and a caretaker residence. A garage and other barns and outbuildings may be constructed. All the buildings
must be located within the ten-acre envelope as well as any roadways, utility lines; water wells water storage
tanks, waterlines and septic tanks. The 10-acre building area may not be located in wildlife birthing areas,
goshawk nesting habitats or riparian areas. The conservation easement would permanently prohibit buildings
or other improvements on the acres outside of the 10-acre building envelope. Further, there could be no
quarrying or mining on the property.
10.

Subject to some restrictions, that included specified habits and riparian areas or the County

building requirements regarding slope and setbacks, the purchaser chooses which ten contiguous acres to use
for the building envelope, and then chooses the home site within those acres. Norman Provan. an owner of one
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of the subject lots, and Mr. Anderson both testified that not onl> could the homeowners choose the site of the
building envelope it was possible to move the building envelope at least until construction commenced, and
even then there was some possibility of adjustment as long as it encompassed the buildings. Mr. Andersen
testified that typically the location of the building envelope was limited only by County building restrictions.
During the period now subject to the rollback, the 10-acre building envelopes had not yet been designated.
Based on these factors the Commission fmds that during the rollback period there was no specific one-acre of
the property designated as the home site or ten acres designated as the building envelope.
11.

Mr. Provan, an owner of one of the subject lots testified that he purchased the lot because of

size and restrictions on development. He indicated he chose the property over other subdivisions because he
liked that all 14,000 acres would be preserved with the same restrictions and remain as a wilderness setting.
He also felt he was doing something good by preserving open space Another owner, Mike Sullivan testified
that they purchased the property because they wanted the large acreage and a place to ride their horses. It was
his understanding that the restrictions on the property made it so that each lot could not be subdivided.
12.

As the property had been ranched for many years it had been assessed under the Farmland

Assessment Act ("F AA") for property tax purposes, based on its agricultural use, rather than its market value.
Agricultural use continues over most of the Ranch property as of the date of the hearing as the Homeowners
Association leases the Ranch property out to a sheep operation. A property owner may fence their 10-acre
building envelope to keep the sheep out of that portion of the property, but must allow sheep to graze on the
remaining acreage. As of the lien date, none of the Petitioners had chosen to fence their 10-acre building
envelopes and have allowed the sheep to graze throughout their properties. The Count} had assessed these
properties with the entire parcel valued as greenbelt property under the FAA even after the subdivision was
platted, up until the time a building permit was issued. Once a building permit was taken out on a particular
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parcel the Counts removed the one-acre home site from valuation under the FAA and that one-acre became
subject to the roll back tax. However, the County considered the other 159-acres or more on each parcel to
remain as greenbelt and the County continues to assess the remaining acres under the FAA.
13.

The FAA requires disparate treatment regarding the home site and remaining acres that are

ranched or farmed. Pursuant to the FAA. the farmhouse and land used in connection with the farmhouse is not
taxed under the act. but is instead assessed based on fair market value For greenbelt properties located outside
of city limits, Wasatch County applies a standard of one as the land used in connection with the farmhouse, or
home site.
14.

As there had been sales of lots in the Ranch, there was market information to determine a fair

market value for each parcel at issue The reason the matter came before the Commission for the Formal
Hearing was that the parties were in disagreement on how much of the total value of the 160-acre parcels
should be attributed to the one-acre home sites. A determination of the value for the one-acre is relevant for
the purposes of determining the amount of the rollback, as well as for the assessment for the 2006-year.
15.

When the County issued the Tax Notices for the years that are now subject to the rollback, the

notices did not list out or allocate a portion of the total market value to either the home site acre or the building
envelope. Instead, the notices listed a single, total market value for the entire parcels Because the property
was taxed as greenbelt under the FAA, the amount of the tax assessed, however, was not based on the market
value, but instead on the greenbelt value pursuant to the FAA.
16.

Petitioners submitted an appraisal for each of the properties at issue, which had been prepared

by Philip Cook, MAI, and CRE. Mr. Cook's appraisal was limited to a market valuation of the land only It
was Mr Cook's appraisal conclusion that there was some variation in values between the lots, due to factors
like view, slope and forestation It was his appraisal conclusion that the total market value of the land for each
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of the parcels at issue, as of January 1. 2006, was as follov\s:
Lot 12
Lot 25
Lot 46
Lot 50
Lot 53
Lot 61

$1.3 50.000
$1,340,000
$1,410,000
$1,715,000
$1,285,000
$1,715,000

Lot 75 $1,850,000
17.

Mr. Cook's market values for each subject parcel were not substantially disputed by

Respondent. Mr. Cook's market value conclusions for the land were based on eleven lot sales, all located
within the Ranch. The sales had occurred from October 2004 through May 2006. The lots had sold for prices
ranging from $1,225,000 to $1,800,000.
18.

In his appraisal Mr Cook also gave his opinion of how the total value should be allocated to

the various components of the lot, including the one-acre home site. It was his position that allocations to the
functional areas of each lot must reflect the market value and he indicated there were circumstances when a
separate value for a home site consisting as part of a larger parcel could be determined. However, it was his
conclusion that in this matter, any allocation of the total purchase price of the) lot to the home site was simply
not market supported. He reached this conclusion because the 160 acres could not be subdivided and with the
restrictions from zoning and conservation easements the highest and best use of the subject lots were as large
160-acre single family lots. He pointed to the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and
indicates that they specifically warn against allocating value without market support.1 It was his opinion that
the County had apportioned the values to the various components of the lots arbitrarily

It was Mr Cook's

conclusion that if it is necessary to allocate or apportion part of the total lot value to the home site acre, it could
only be done pro rata. 1 160th of the total value, as it is the entire lot and the similarity to all other lots within
1 Mr Cook cites to Imform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and Advisory Opinions. 2006 Edition. Appraisal
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the development that create the value.
19.

David A. Thomas, Professor of Law. testified that the zoning and conservation easement had

to be taken into account in determining the value. It was his opinion that it was not legal to buy or sell any
portion of the lot smaller than the total 160 acres. This was a point that was supported bv all evidence and not
disputed. It was Professor Thomas* conclusion that because OIIQ acre could not be sold separately, there was
no fair market value for the one-acre home site, only a value for the property as a whole. Professor Thomas
also pointed out that additional value will be taxed in the improvements.
20.

Robert Crawford, PhD, testified that the conservation easement actually enhanced the value of

the property. He also testified that the highest and best use of the property was not for agriculture, it was
instead as a 160-acre residential building lot. As part of the whole he concluded that each acre of the 160-acre
property had the same value as all the other acres. He stated that a fair market value for the one-acre home site
could be determined but only on the basis of 1/160 of the total value as indicated by Mr. Cook. It was Dr.
Crawford^s conclusion that recognizing an allocated valuation method to all the acres is economically valid as
it the way of expressing the enhanced value of the whole. The right to build a residence somewhere on the
property presumably increase the value of the 160 acre lot. That will be reflected in the price per acre. He did
not find an extracted market value using lots similar in size that have sold to be a valid valuation technique.
21.

Glen Burgener, the Wasatch County Assessor, testified that under the FAA, the County is

required to allocate a portion of the total value to the home site acre, which is subject to tax on a fair market
value basis, while the remainder of the property was taxable under greenbelt. He testified that he had been
applying the FAA to properties for seventeen years in Wastatch County. The County had farms with home
sites on numerous properties of varying zones where the County is required to allocate a portion of the total

Standards Board. The Appraisal Foundation, Standards Rule 1 -4(e; Comment
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value to the home site. In addition to farms in the P-160 zone, there were farms with home sites on properties
in the following zones: A-20 allowing only I residence per 20 acres; R-A-5 allowing only one residence per 5
acres; R-A-l allowing onlv one residence per 1-acre. To establish a value for the home site, the County would
consider values of buildable lots in the area. It was the County's position that the right to build a residence is
part of the home site value.
22.

In 1999, when the subject lots were platted and because of the conservation easement, Mr.

Burgener sought adv ise from representatives of the State Tax Commission's Propertv Tax Division on how to
allocate the total values of the propertv. At this time, the County made the determination that the total value,
which was based on the sales, would be allocated 60% to the primary residential buildable site, 22% to the
secondary or caretaker's buildable site, $25,000 per acre to the rest of the acres in the building envelope and
whatever was left of the market value to the remaining acres. It was the County *s position that a substantial
portion of the value of the remaining 150-acres shifted to the 10 acres building envelope due to the
conservation easement. However, this valuation break out was not conveyed to the property owners on the
annual Tax Notices issued for the years that are now subject to the rollback.
23.

Blaine D. Hales, Certified General Appraiser, prepared an appraisal for the Respondent for

purposes of estimating the value of the one-acre home site on the property. The appraisal was prepared for one
lot Lot 75, which was the Crittenden property. It was the County's intent that the same methodology for
determining the value for the home site be applied to the other properties. It was Vlr Hales conclusion that the
total value of Lot 75 was SI, 800,000, of which SI,200,000 was for the one-acre home site and S600.000 for
the reaming 159 acres.
24

In his appraisal. Mr Hales determined the value of the one-acre site by estimating the overall

value of the entire parcel and using additional data to allocate or estimate the value contributed by the one-acre
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home site to the overall parcel. It was his conclusion that he could determine a fair allocation of the market
value, despite that the one acre could not be legally sold separately.
25.

Like Mr. Cook. Mr. Hales' estimate of the total market value came from sales within the

Ranch, all located very near Lot 75. He also considered the purchase price of Lot 75, which was $1,800,000
on October 29, 2004. It was his conclusion that the fair market value of the land only on Lot 75. as of the
January 1. 2006 lien date, was $1,800,000. As a comparison, Mr. Cook had valued this lot at $1,850,000.
26.

To determine a value for the one acre home site, it was Mr. Hales position that the building

site, when reduced to one acre, must also include the legal right to construct a home because the appraiser must
be careful to divide both the physical and legal components of the property. He attributed the right to build to
the one acre while the remaining 159 acres he considered to have only the limited agricultural and recreational
uses.
27.

To estimate the allocation to the one acre, Mr. Hales relied on two methods: 1) determining the

value of the unbuildable portion of the property; and 2) determining the value of the right to build by
considering sales of conservation easements. To determine the value of the unbuildable land, Mr. Hales found
six comparables of rangeland with recreational desirability, but without the right for potential residential
development. He concluded that these sales indicated a value for the unbuildable portion of the property to be
$500,000. In this analysis, Mr Hales indicated that he considered 159 acres as unbuildable and only the oneacre, used by the County as the home site, as buildable. From the analysis of conservation easements he relied
on six sales and concluded that the right to build on the subject along with the one-acre home site would
represent approximately 65% of the subject's value while the remainder should be allocated to the unbuildable
agricultural and recreational land In his reconciliation of the two approaches he concluded that 65% of the
total value should be allocated to the buildable home site and the remainder to the agricultural land
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28.

Upon review of all the evidence in this matter, the Commission concludes that prior to

designation of the 10-acre building envelope, as evidenced by the issuance of a building permit, there would be
no distinction in value from one acre to the next for the 160 acre parcels, as the right to build was attached to
the value of the entire lot as a whole and each acre up to the 160 acres contributed equally to the value.
29.

However, once the 10-acre building envelope has been designated, the value is no longer

equallv contributed on a per acre basis. All development and improvement must be limited to the ten acres.
The right to build attaches to the building envelope. Furthermore, the restrictions of the conservation easement
are then attached to the now identifiable 150 acres. The owner may no longer build fences, roadways, corrals,
swimming pools, manmade ponds or gardens on the 150 acres. Once the building envelope has been
established there is a clearly identifiable difference between the 10-acre building envelope and the remainder of
the property, a difference that does impact how these two portions of property- contribute to the value.
30.

Regardless of the fact that a one-acre home site may not legally be sold separately from the

159 acres of the lot, the County must allocate a fair market value to the one-acre based on the express language
of the FAA. Mr. Hales was the only party who attempted to do this in a manner that reflects the reality that the
building site is worth more than the undevelopable property subject to the conservation easement. Absent
evidence from Petitioner's experts that addressed the disparity in value, the Commission accepts Mr. Hales
conclusion that 65% of the value of the total lot is attributable to the developable portion of the land.
However, the Commission finds that the building site is not one-acre, it is ten-acres From a review of Mr.
Hales' appraisal, his testimony at the hearing regarding the 10-acre building site and that of the other vv itnesses
describing the potential for the 10-acre envelope, the Commission concludes that the 65% for the buildable
portion applies to the 10 buildable acres and is not appropriately limited to a one-acre home site. Nine of the
ten buildable acres as of the lien date were still being used for agricultural purposes and one acre must be
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valued as the home site according to statute As far as allocating a portion of the 65% to the one-acre, the
Commission is unable to further determine which portion of the value is attributable to each acre, other than
using 1 ;10 of the 65% of the total market value.
31.

Mr. Cook has appraised each individual lot at issue in this appeal to determine a total value as

of the January 1, 2006 lien date. The County's assessments for 2006 were not always consistent with Mr.
Cook's conclusions. The County did not substantially refute Mr. Cook's total values for each lot, and the
County did not submit an appraisal of each lot. For tax year 2006, the Commission accepts Mr. Cook's total
lot v alue for the land portion of each of the subject properties. The Commission finds the value of the 10- acre
building envelope to be 65% of the total lot value, and the one-acre home site value to be U10 of the 65%
attributed to the building envelope.
APPLICABLE LAW
1.

All tangible taxable property shall be assessed and taxed at a uniform and equal rate on the

basis of its fair market value, as valued on January 1, unless otherwise provide by law. (2) Beginning January
1, 1995, the fair market value of residential property shall be reduced by 45%, representing a residential
exemption allowed under Utah Constitution Article XIII, Section 2, Utah Constitution. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2103.)
2.

''Fair market value" means the amount at which property would change hands between a

willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having
reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. For purposes of taxation, "fair market \ alue" shall be determined
using the current zoning laws applicable to the property in question, except in cases where there is a reasonable
probability of a change in the zoning laws affecting that property in the tax year in question and the change
would have an appreciable influence upon the value. (Utah Code Sec 59-2-102(12).)
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3.

For general property tax purposes, land may be assessed on the basis of the value that the land

has for agricultural use if the land: (a) is not less than five contiguous acres in area. . . and (b) except as
provided in Subsection )5): (i) is actively devoted to agricultural use: and (ii) has been actively devoted to
agricultural use for at least two successive years immediately preceding the ta,x year for vvhich the land is being
assessed under this part. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-503(1).)
4.

All structures which are located on land in agricultural use, the farmhouse and the land on

which the farmhouse is located, and land used in connection with the farmhoUse. shall be valued, assessed, and
taxed using the same standards, methods, and procedures that apply to other taxable structures and other land
in the county. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-507(2).)
5.

(2) In addition to the value determined in accordance with Subsection (1), the fair market

value assessment shall be included on the notices described in (a) Subsection 59-2-919(4); and (b) Section 592-1317. (3)The county board of equalization shall review the agricultural use value and fair market value
assessments each year as provided under Section 59-2-1001. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-505 (2)&(3).)
6.

Except as provided in this section, Section 59-2-506.5 or Section 59-2-511, if land is

withdrawn from this part, the land is subject to a roll back tax imposed in accordance with this section. (Utah
Code Sec. 59-2-506(1).)
7.

The county assessor shall determine the amount of the rollback tax by computing the

difference for the rollback period described in Subsection (3)(b) between: (i) the tax paid wile the land was
assessed under this part; and (ii) the tax that would have been paid had the property not been assessed under
this part. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-506(3).)
8.

Any person dissatisfied with the decision of the county board of equalization concerning the

assessment and equalization of any property, or the determination of any exemption in which the person has an
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interest. may appeal that decision to the commission b> filing a notice of appeal specifying the grounds for the
appeal with the county auditor vvithm 30 days after the final action of the county board. (Utah Code Sec 59-21006(1).)
9.

(2) In assessing the fair market value of a parcel of property that is subject to a minimum

parcel size of one acre or more, a county assessor shall include as part of the assessment: (a) that the parcel of
property may not be subdivided into parcels of property smaller than the minimum parcel size; and (b) any
effects Subsection (2)(a) may have on the fair market value of the parcel of property. (3) This section does not
prohibit a county assessor from including as part of an assessment of the fair market value of a parcel of
property any other factor affecting the fair market value of the parcel of property. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2301.2(2) & (3).)
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Petitioner has raised two separate but related issues. The first is whether the value of a home

site contained within a larger and unsubdividable property may be retroactrvely established at the time of
assessment of a rollback tax. The second is the fair market value of the existing home site for purposes of
determining the current year's property tax assessment. To begin, a determination of the rollback tax presents
issues of both fact and law to the Commission. Pursuant to Utah Code Sec. 59-2-506 the amount of the
rollback tax is computed by taking the difference between the tax paid during the roll back period based on its
agricultural use under the FAA and the tax that would have been paid annually based on an a fair market value
assessment. For each year of the rollback period, the County on an annual basis had already determined the
fair market value for the subject property Furthermore, the County was required to list the fair market value
on the Tax Valuation Notices as they were issued each year If Petitioners were in disagreement with the
market value set by the County. Petitioners* recourse was to appeal the market value each year as provided in
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Sec. 59-2-1001. Therefore, the total fair market value for each properly at issue for the rollback years was
already established b\ the County pursuant to the annual notices they issued that were not appealed and may
not now be challenged by either party based on the circumstances in this matter.
2.

Respondent's witnesses acknowledged, and it was supported by the exhibits and testimonv of

Petitioners* witnesses, that when the County listed the fair market value on the annual notices mailed out for
the years subject to the rollback, it listed only a total value for the entire 160-acre parcel without any breakout
for home site land. Petitioners did not file annual appeals regarding the total market value indicated on the
notices for each of the rollback years. Petitioners were not given the opportunity to challenge the County's
allocation of the total market value to the home site acre, because they were never given notice of what that
amount was. Had Petitioners been notified of the allocation to the home site acre, and that it was an amount
different from a 1/160 allocation of the total value, Petitioners may have appealed the value on annual basis as
is provided in the statute at Utah Code Section 59-2-505 and 59-2-1001.
3.

Furthermore, the Commission notes that for rollback purposes, valuation is based on the

property, as it existed during the rollback period. Valuation is not based on the condition of the property that
results after a portion has been withdrawn from greenbelt. The Commission finds that if the County valued the
home site at a higher rate during the rollback years, the County should have indicated so annually on its
valuation notices as they were issued for each of those years, so that the home site value could have been
appealed annually pursuant to Utah Code Section 59-2-505 and 59-2-1001. Failure to do so alone is sufficient
for the Commission to find that rollback tax is limited to 1/160th2 of the total value listed by the County each
year in its valuation notices issued to Petitioners.

Additionally, this legal basis is supported by the

Commission's factual conclusion that during the rollback period, there were no designated building envelopes

2 For Lot 46 which was 134 acres the rollback tax must be based on 1 184" of the total value
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or home sites and, therefore, each one of the 160 acres was as valuable as the rest Prior to the issuance of the
building permit there would have been no basis for the County to determine the one-acre home site upon which
the residence would be located.
4.

With respect to the second issue, the question of the current home site value, it is the

Commission's conclusion that the issue of determining the market value of the one-acre home site for the 2006
lien date presents both legal and factual issues. Petitioners' witness. Dr. Thomas, argued that a market value
could not be determined for the one acre as it could not be legally separated. Petitioners also argue that Utah
Code Sec. 59-2-301.2 regarding minimum parcel size supports their contention. Although the one-acre home
site may not legally be sold separately, Utah Code Sec. 59-2-507 requires that the County assess it at fair
market value and is the specific and controlling statute on the taxation of a home site used in connection with
greenbelt property. Subsection 507(2) provides that the farmhouse and land used in connection with the
farmhouse shall be valued, assessed, and taxed using the same standards, methods and procedures that apply to
other taxable land and structures in the County. However, the subsection does not provide specific guidance
on how to make that determination when the home site is part of an unsubdividable lot. Utah Code Sec. 59-2301.2 does prohibit the County from valuing the 160-acre subject parcels as if they were subdividable into
numerous single-family residential lots. The County has not valued this property as if higher density was
allowed. Furthermore, subsection 59-2-301.2 (3) expressly provides that the County Assessor may include as
part of the assessment other factors affecting the fair market value of the parcel of property. Finally, the fact
that Mr. Cook's valuations differ based on specific property characteristics, in addition to size, implicitly
demonstrates that the value of any given unit of land may vary from another within each lot
5.

The Commission finds that each acre of the 160- acre parcel contributes to value. Prior to the

designation of the building envelope this was on an equal basis. However, once the buildable envelope was
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designated, as had occurred for all properties subject to this appeal by the 2006 lien date, there are two distinct
and identifiable classes of property, the 10 acre building envelope and the remaining undevelopable area
covered b> the conservation easement. These two areas do not contribute equallv to the value Respondent has
offered an appraisal that makes a distinction. Although the Commission disagrees with the limitation of the
analysis to the one acre, because the entire 10 acres is developable with the possibility of a second home,
garages, barns, outbuildings, yard features and so forth, which all contribute to the value of the building site,
the Commission finds that in the absence of testimony and evidence to the contrary, Mr. Hales' analysis
adequately supports that 65% of the value is attributable to the buildable envelope for these properties.
6.

As of the lien date, only one acre of the ten-acre buildable envelope had been withdrawn from

greenbelt for each of these properties. As additional improvements are made in the buildable envelope,
additional acreage may be withdrawn and rollback assessed.
DECISION AND ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds that the County is to calculate the
rollback taxes for each of the properties for each rollback year based on the market value for the home site acre
being 1'160th or 1/184th' depending on the size of the lot, of the total value indicated for that vear on the tax
notices issued by the County. The County is to calculate the fair market value of the home site acre for the
2006 tax vear for each parcel at issue on the basis of 65% of the total value of the lot as determined in the Cook
appraisal div ided by 10. It is so ordered The County Auditor is ordered to adjust the assessment records as
appropriate in compliance with this order.
DATED this

/

da> of

C ^ ^ ^ t J ^

2008

^(yvil pWv—Jarfe Phan
'
Administrative Law Judge
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BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE T.AX COMMISSION:
The Commission has reviewed this case and the undersigned concur in this decision.
DATED this

/

day of

L ^ & 4 ^ ^

D

2008.

EXCUSED

Pam Hendnckson
Commission Chai

R. Bruce Johnson
Commissioner

DVZooi/Vt,^rv

Marc B. Johns
Commissioner

D'Arcy Dixon PigQ&felli
Commissioner

Notice of Appeal Rights: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for
Reconsideration with the Tax Commission Appeals Unit pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec 63-46b-13. A
Request for Reconsideration must allege newl\ discovered evidence or a mistake of lav. or fact. If you do not
file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, this order constitutes final agency action. You have
thirty (30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this order in accordance with Utah Code
Sec. 59-1-601 et seq and 63-46b-13 et seq.
JKP06-1504fofdoc
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EXHIBIT 2

Utah Code Section 59-1-610. Standard of review of appellate court.
(1) When reviewing formal adjudicative proceedings commenced before the
commission, the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court shall:
(a) grant the commission deference concerning its written findings of fact,
applying a substantial evidence standard on review; and
(b) grant the commission no deference concerning its conclusions of law,
applying a correction of error standard, unless there is an explicit grant of
discretion contained in a statute at issue before the appellate court.
(2) This section supercedes Section 63G-4-403 pertaining to judicial review of
formal adjudicative proceedings.

EXHIBIT 3

Utah Section Code 59-2-102 (Superseded 01/01/09). Definitions.
(12) "Fair market value" means the amount at which property would change hands
between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to
buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. For
purposes of taxation, "fair market value" shall be determined using the current
zoning laws applicable to the property in question, except in cases where there is
a reasonable probability of a change in the zoning laws affecting that property in
the tax year in question and the change would have an appreciable influence upon
the value.

EXHIBIT 4

Utah Code Section 59-2-507. Land included as agricultural -- Site of
farmhouse excluded -Taxation of structures and site of farmhouse.
(1) Land under barns, sheds, silos, cribs, greenhouses and like structures,
lakes, dams, ponds, streams, and irrigation ditches and like facilities is included in
determining the total area of land actively devoted to agricultural use. Land which
is under the farmhouse and land used in connection with the farmhouse is
excluded from that determination.
(2) All structures which are located on land in agricultural use, the farmhouse
and the land on which the farmhouse is located, and land used in connection with
the farmhouse, shall be valued, assessed, and taxed using the same standards,
methods, and procedures that apply to other taxable structures and other land in
the county.

EXHIBIT 5

this is the only logical and fair way to divide the property. Other divisions might be suggested;
however, those divisions frequently would benefit one party or another by complicating the
process and making it difficult, if not impossible, to estimate the value of the building site.

The following chart illustrates my division of the building site and the agricultural land. Please
note that 1 have included a division for both the physical and legal aspects of the property.

DIVISION OF WOLF CREEK LOT
Physical Division

Legal Division

||

[Building Site

1 Acre

Right to build residence

II

1 Greenbelt Land

159 Acres

Right to graze, hunt, and recreate

In theory, any division of the property should create two separate parcels whose combined
value would equal the value of the larger parcel before the division. In my opinion, the best
method to estimate the value of the two parcels is to estimate the value of the overall property
(160-acre lot) and then allocate the value between the one-acre building site and the rest of the
land. Using this method of allocation would ensure that the property owner was not overtaxed or
undertaxed. This method of valuation is a common procedure used by assessors all over the
state. For example, an assessor estimating the value of a motel will frequently rely exclusively
on the income approach. However, the income approach estimates the overall value of the
property. Most appraisers will allocate the value between three major components that give
value to the hotel. Those three components include personal property (or FFE), land, and the
building. The assessor will frequently estimate the value of the personal property or take that
information from the declarations by the property owner. Finally, the appraiser will estimate the
value of the site. The balance of the value will be allocated to the building. This method of
allocation is frequently used to break out the difference values of the component parts of the
property. In my opinion, this is the method which should be used to estimate the value of the
one-acre building site on the subject property.

The overall value of the subject property has already been estimated in the previous section. At
this point in the appraisal, we must provide an allocation of value between the one-acre building
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site (with all rights to build) versus 159 acres of land with rights to graze, hunt, and recreate.
There are several methods that can be used to help estimate this allocation. The first method
would be to estimate the value of a highly desirable building site with excellent amenities and
very high desirability. This approach could be pursued by accumulating sates of desirable oneacre recreational lots and using them as comparables to estimate a reasonable value for the
subject site. This method is not perfect. There are no one-acre building sites available for sale
in the Wolf Creek project. However, if a buyer could purchase a single one-acre building site in
the subject's exclusive neighborhood, it is likely that it would sell for a very high price. Since
there are no sales in the subdivision, the appraiser would have to extend his search into other
exclusive neighborhoods which have desirable amenities. These neighborhoods would likely
include some of the more exclusive neighborhoods in Heber, Midway, and the Park City area.
Making adjustments to lots in different exclusive neighborhoods can be very difficult.

A second possible method would be to estimate the value of the range land with recreational
desirability but without the rights or potential for residential development. The 159 acres could
be valued using large acreage comparables, and the difference between this value and the
subject's overall value would be allocated to the building site. Once again, this method is
reasonable but it has some drawbacks. It is very difficult to find recreational land in the subject
neighborhood that has no potential for construction of even a single homesite. Fortunately, t
was able to find a sale that fits these parameters.

Finally, a third method that can help the appraiser to allocate value is an analysis of
conservation easements. Conservation easements are purchased by people, associations, and
government entities. These easements most frequently strip the land of its development rights
and only leave the agricultural and recreational rights to the property owner. The cost of this
type of easement (or the cost of buying the development rights off the property) can give a
good indication of the value that the building site contributes to the subject property. Making
direct comparisons would be almost impossible because of the differences in location and
desirability. However, by considering percentages of value, we can make a reasonable estimate
of value for the building rights and the remaining land.
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EXHIBIT 6

placed, erected, a'tered, or permitted to remain on any Parcel other than one (1) primary single"
family Dwelling, one (1) caretaker dwelling and one (1) garage together with related
nonresidential Improvements which have been approved by ttje Architectural/Technical
Committee At the time of construction of the primary single family Dwelling on any Parcel,
said Parcel must also be improved with a garage with at least a two (2) car capacity. Whenever
possible, the garage doors will not face towards Lhe main access road or the main view corridor
frcm other Owner's homesites. A garage must be provided for each owned vehicle. One (1)
caretaker dwelling may be constructed on each Parcel, provided that the size and location and all
aspects of such caretaker dwelling are approved by the Architectural/Technical Committee and.,
provcled rurther, th.it lhe applicable zoning and building ordinances of any governmental entity
ha\ ng aMihjnty with respect to the Property permits the construction of a caretaker dwelling. In
no e,er, Snail the caretaker dwelling on any Parcel have a Floor .Area in excess of 2,000 square
feet The caretaker dwelling shall USQ Lhe same driveway access used by uhe primary singlcfamil) Dwelling on such Parcel The distance between the caretaker dwelling and the primary
smgie-family Dwelling on each Parcel shall be no greater than 300 fe$t.

EXHIBIT 7

Utah Constitution - Article XIII, Section 6. [State Tax Commission.]
(1) There shall be a State Tax Commission consisting of four members, not
more than two of whom may belong to the same political party.
(2) With the consent of the Senate, the Governor shall appoint the members
of the State Tax Commission for such terms as may be provided by statute.
(3) The State Tax Commission shall:
(a) administer and supervise the State's tax laws;
(b) assess mines and public utilities and have such other powers of original
assessment as the Legislature may provide by statute;
(c) adjust and equalize the valuation and assessment of property among the
counties;
(d) as the Legislature provides by statute, review proposed bond issues,
revise local tax levies, and equalize the assessment and valuation of property
within the counties; and
(e) have other powers as may be provided by statute.
(4) Notwithstanding the powers granted to the State Tax Commission in this
Constitution, the Legislature may by statute authorize any court established
under Article VIII to adjudicate, review, reconsider, or redetermine any matter
decided by the State Tax Commission relating to revenue and taxation.

Utah Code Section 58-56-4. Definitions - Adoption of building codes Amendments - Approval of other codes - Exemptions.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "agricultural use" means a use that relates to the tilling of soil and raising
of crops, or keeping or raising domestic animals;
(b) "not for human occupancy" means use of a structure for purposes other
than protection or comfort of human beings, but allows people to enter the
structure for:
(i) maintenance and repair; and
(ii) the care of livestock, crops, or equipment intended for agricultural use
which are kept there; and
(c) "residential area" means land that is not used for an agricultural use and
is:
(i) (A) within the boundaries of a city or town; and
(B) less than five contiguous acres;
(ii) (A) within a subdivision for which the county has approved a subdivision
plat under Title 17, Chapter 27a, Part 6, Subdivisions; and
(B) less than two contiguous acres; or
(iii) not located in whole or in part in an agricultural protection area created
under Title 17, Chapter 41, Agriculture Protection Area.
(2) (a) Subject to the provisions of Subsections (4) and (5), the following
codes, each of which must be promulgated by a nationally recognized code
authority, shall be adopted, in the manner described in Subsection (2)(b), as the
construction codes which the state and each political subdivision of the state
shall follow in the circumstances described in Subsection (3):
(i) a building code;
(ii) the National Electrical Code promulgated by the National Fire Protection
Association;
(iii) a residential one and two family dwelling code;
(iv) a plumbing code;
(v) a mechanical code;
(vi) a fuel gas code;
(vii) an energy conservation code; and
(viii) a manufactured housing installation standard code.
(b) In accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking
Act, the division, in collaboration with the commission, shall adopt by rule specific
editions of the codes described in Subsection (2)(a), and may adopt by rule
successor editions of any adopted code.
(c)The division, in collaboration with the commission, may, in accordance
with Section 58-56-7, adopt amendments to the codes adopted under Subsection
(2)(a), to be applicable to the entire state or within one or more political
subdivisions.
(3) Subject to the provisions of Subsections (4) and (5), the codes and
amendments adopted under Subsection (2) shall be followed when:
(a) new construction is involved;

(b) the owner of an existing building, or the owner's agent, is voluntarily
engaged in:
(i) the repair, renovation, remodeling, alteration, enlargement, rehabilitation,
conservation, or reconstruction of the building; or
(ii) changing the character or use of the building in a manner which increases
the occupancy loads, other demands, or safety risks of the building.
(4) (a) The division, in collaboration with the commission, has discretion to
approve, without adopting, certain codes in addition to those described in
Subsection (2)(a), including specific editions of the codes, for use by a
compliance agency.
(b) If the applicable code is one which the division has approved under
Subsection (4)(a), a compliance agency has the discretion to:
(i) adopt an ordinance requiring removal, demolition, or repair of a building,
according to a code;
(ii) adopt, by ordinance or rule, a dangerous building code; or
(iii) adopt, by ordinance or rule, a building rehabilitation code.
(5) (a) Except in a residential area, a structure used solely in conjunction with
agriculture use, and not for human occupancy, is exempted from the permit
requirements of any code adopted by the division.
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (5)(a), unless otherwise exempted, plumbing,
electrical, and mechanical permits may be required when that work is included in
the structure.
Utah Code Section 59-1-602. Right to appeal -- Venue -- County as party in
interest.
(1) (a) Any aggrieved party appearing before the commission or county whose
tax revenues are affected by the decision may at that party's option petition for
judicial review in the district court pursuant to this section, or in the Supreme
Court or the Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 59-1-610.
(b) Judicial review of formal or informal adjudicative proceedings in the district
is in the district court located in the county of residence or principal place of
business of the affected taxpayer or, in the case of a taxpayer whose taxes are
assessed on a statewide basis, to the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County.
(c) Notwithstanding Section 63G-4-402, a petition for review made to the
district court under this section shall conform to the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
(2) A county whose tax revenues are affected by the decision being reviewed
shall be allowed to be a party in interest in the proceeding before the court.

Utah Code Section 59-2-301.2. Definitions -- Assessment of property
subject to a minimum parcel size -- Other factors affecting fair market
value.
(1) "Minimum parcel size" means the minimum size that a parcel of property
may be divided into under a zoning ordinance adopted by a:
(a) county in accordance with Title 17, Chapter 27a, Part 5, Land Use
Ordinances; or
(b) city or town in accordance with Title 10, Chapter 9a, Part 5, Land Use
Ordinances.
(2) In assessing the fair market value of a parcel of property that is subject to
a minimum parcel size of one acre or more, a county assessor shall include as
part of the assessment:
(a) that the parcel of property may not be subdivided into parcels of property
smaller than the minimum parcel size; and
(b) any effects Subsection (2)(a) may have on the fair market value of the
parcel of property.
(3) This section does not prohibit a county assessor from including as part of
an assessment of the fair market value of a parcel of property any other factor
affecting the fair market value of the parcel of property.
Utah Code Section 59-2-505. Indicia of value for agricultural use
assessment -- Inclusion of fair market value on certain property tax notices.
(1) (a) The county assessor shall consider only those indicia of value that the
land has for agricultural use as determined by the commission when assessing
land:
(i) that meets the requirements of Section 59-2-503 to be assessed under this
part; and
(ii) for which the owner has:
(A) made a timely application in accordance with Section 59-2-508 for
assessment under this part for the tax year for which the land is being assessed;
and
(B) obtained approval of the application described in Subsection (1)(a)(ii)(A)
from the county assessor.
(b) If land that becomes subject to a conservation easement created in
accordance with Title 57, Chapter 18, Land Conservation Easement Act, meets
the requirements of Subsection (1)(a) for assessment under this part, the county
assessor shall consider only those indicia of value that the land has for
agricultural use in accordance with Subsection (1)(a) when assessing the land.
(2) In addition to the value determined in accordance with Subsection (1), the
fair market value assessment shall be included on the notices described in:
(a) Section 59-2-919.1; and
(b) Section 59-2-1317.
(3) The county board of equalization shall review the agricultural use value
and fair market value assessments each year as provided under Section 59-21001.

Utah Code Section 59-2-506. Rollback tax -- Penalty - Computation of tax -Procedure -- Lien - Interest -- Notice -- Collection - Distribution - Appeal to
county board of equalization.
(1) Except as provided in this section, Section 59-2-506.5, or Section 59-2-511,
if land is withdrawn from this part, the land is subject to a rollback tax imposed in
accordance with this section.
(2) (a) An owner shall notify the county assessor that land is withdrawn from
this part within 120 days after the day on which the land is withdrawn from this
part.
(b) An owner that fails to notify the county assessor under Subsection (2)(a)
that land is withdrawn from this part is subject to a penalty equal to the greater of:
(i) $10; or
(ii) 2% of the rollback tax due for the last year of the rollback period.
(3) (a) The county assessor shall determine the amount of the rollback tax by
computing the difference for the rollback period described in Subsection (3)(b)
between:
(i) the tax paid while the land was assessed under this part; and
(ii) the tax that would have been paid had the property not been assessed
under this part.
(b) For purposes of this section, the rollback period is a time period that:
(i) begins on the later of:
(A) the date the land is first assessed under this part; 6r
(B) five years preceding the day on which the county assessor mails the notice
required by Subsection (5); and
(ii) ends the day on which the county assessor mails the notice required by
Subsection (5).
(4) (a) The county treasurer shall:
(i) collect the rollback tax; and
(ii) after the rollback tax is paid, certify to the county recorder that the rollback
tax lien on the property has been satisfied by:
(A) preparing a document that certifies that the rollback tax lien on the property
has been satisfied; and
(B) providing the document described in Subsection (4)(a)(ii)(A) to the county
recorder for recordation.
(b) The rollback tax collected under this section shall:
(i) be paid into the county treasury; and
(ii) be paid by the county treasurer to the various taxing entities pro rata in
accordance with the property tax levies for the current year.
(5) (a) The county assessor shall mail to an owner of the land that is subject to
a rollback tax a notice that:
(i) the land is withdrawn from this part;
(ii) the land is subject to a rollback tax under this section; and
(iii) the rollback tax is delinquent if the owner of the land does not pay the tax
within 30 days after the day on which the county assessor mails the notice.
(b) (i) The rollback tax is due and payable on the day the county assessor mails
the notice required by Subsection (5)(a).
(ii) Subject to Subsection (7), the rollback tax is delinquent if an owner of the

land that is withdrawn from this part does not pay the rollback tax within 30 days
after the day on which the county assessor mails the notice required by
Subsection (5)(a).
(6) (a) Subject to Subsection (6)(b), the following are a lien on the land
assessed under this part:
(i) the rollback tax; and
(ii) interest imposed in accordance with Subsection (7).
(b) The lien described in Subsection (6)(a) shall:
(i) arise upon the imposition of the rollback tax under this section;
(ii) end on the day on which the rollback tax and interest imposed in
accordance with Subsection (7) are paid in full; and
(iii) relate back to the first day of the rollback period described in Subsection
(3)(b).
(7) (a) A delinquent rollback tax under this section shall accrue interest:
(i) from the date of delinquency until paid; and
(ii) at the interest rate established under Section 59-2-1331 and in effect on
January 1 of the year in which the delinquency occurs.
(b) A rollback tax that is delinquent on September 1 of any year shall be
included on the notice required by Section 59-2-1317, along with interest
calculated on that delinquent amount through November 30 of the year in which
the notice under Section 59-2-1317 is mailed.
(8) (a) Land that becomes ineligible for assessment under this part, only as a
result of an amendment to this part is not subject to the rollback tax if the owner of
the land notifies the county assessor that the land is withdrawn from this part in
accordance with Subsection (2).
(b) Land described in Subsection (8)(a) that is withdrawn from this part as a
result of an event other than an amendment to this part, whether voluntary or
involuntary, is subject to the rollback tax.
(9) Except as provided in Section 59-2-511, land that becomes exempt from
taxation under Utah Constitution Article XIII, Section 3, is not subject to the
rollback tax if the land meets the requirements of Section 59-2-503 to be assessed
under this part.
(10) (a) Subject to Subsection (10)(b), an owner of land may appeal to the
county board of equalization:
(i) a decision by a county assessor to withdraw land from assessment under
this part; or
(ii) the imposition of a rollback tax under this section.
(b) An owner shall file an appeal under Subsection (10)(a) no later than 45
days after the day on which the county assessor mails the notice required by
Subsection (5).

Utah Code Section 59-2-510. Separation of land.
Separation of a part of the land which is being valued, assessed, and taxed
under this part, either by conveyance or other action of the owner of the land, for a
use other than agricultural, subjects the land which is separated to liability for the
applicable rollback tax, but does not impair the continuance of agricultural use
valuation, assessment, and taxation for the remaining land if it continues to meet
the requirements of this part.

Utah Code Section 63G-4-403. Judicial review - Formal adjudicative
proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of App63als has
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency
action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate
rules of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all
additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review
of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize,
or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for
the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten,
summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is
based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making
process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decisionmaking body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by
the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of
the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(Hi) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational
basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.

Utah Code Section 78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to
issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings
of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative
proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of
Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the
Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state
engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or
other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except
those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons
who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions
constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or
capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first
degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but
not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parenttime, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review
and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original
appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G,
Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative
proceedings.

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 42. Transfer of case from supreme
court to court of appeals.
(a) Discretion of Supreme Court to transfer. At any time before a case is set for oral
argument before the Supreme Court, the Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any
case except those cases within the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction. The order of
transfer shall be issued without opinion, written or oral, as to the merits of the appeal or
the reasons for the transfer.
(b) Notice of order of transfer. Upon entry of the order of transfer the Clerk of the
Supreme Court shall give notice of entry of the order of transfer by mail to each party to
the proceeding and to the clerk of the trial court. Upon entry of the order of transfer, the
Clerk of the Supreme Court shall transfer the original of the order and the case, including
the record and file of the case from the trial court, all papers filed in the Supreme Court,
and a written statement of all docket entries in the case up to and including the order of
transfer, to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals.
(c) Receipt of order of transfer by Court of Appeals. Upon receipt of the original order of
transfer from the Clerk of the Supreme Court, the Clerk of the Court of Appeals shall
enter the appeal upon the Court of Appeals docket. The Clerk of the Court of Appeals
shall immediately give notice to each party to the proceeding and to the clerk of the trial
court that the appeal has been docketed and that all further filings will be made with the
Clerk of the Court of Appeals. The notice shall state the docket number assigned to the
case in the Court of Appeals.
(d) Filing or transfer of appeal record. If the record on appeal has not been filed with the
Clerk of the Supreme Court as of the date of the order of transfer, the Clerk of the
Supreme Court shall notify the clerk of the trial court that upon completion of the
conditions for filing the record by that court, the clerk shall transmit the record on appeal
to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals. If, however, the record on appeal has already been
transmitted to and filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court as of the date of the entry of
the order of transfer, the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall transmit the record on appeal
to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals within five days of the date of the entry of the order
of transfer.
(e) Subsequent proceedings before Court of Appeals. Upon receipt by the Clerk of the
Court of Appeals of the order of transfer and the entry thereof upon the docket of the
Court of Appeals, the case shall proceed before the Court of Appeals to final decision and
disposition as in other appellate cases pursuant to these rules.
(f) Finality of order of transfer. An order of transfer, when entered by the Clerk of the
Supreme Court, is final and shall be subject to reconsideration only in the Supreme Court
and only on jurisdictional grounds.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
Former Rules 4A and 4B have been renumbered as Rules 42 and 43 respectively and
included in a new title governing the certification and transfer of cases between courts.
The amendments make uniform the practices followed by the two appellate courts in
transferring cases.

